

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“What do we want for our City? We want simple justice.” With these words, Mayor Martin J. O’Malley, in his inaugural address last December, declared his aspiration for Baltimore. “A future where justice is not dreamed or deferred, but a goal achieved.” “A City where jobs and opportunity are growing – this...is justice achieved. A City where every block of every street of every neighborhood is a safe and secure place for children to play and grow – this is justice achieved.” A Baltimore “...once again renowned for the life and diversity of our city markets and not for the death and despair of our open-air drug markets.”

Baltimore is the  
second most  
violent big city in  
America.

In his election campaign, Mayor O’Malley had called on the City to unite in a crusade against crime. Today, he has made crime reduction his administration’s top priority – with compelling reason.

The murder rate  
today is over  
seven times the  
national average.

In 1998, the most recent year for comparative data, Baltimore ranked 2<sup>nd</sup> in violent crime rate and 2<sup>nd</sup> in total felony crime rate among the 30 largest cities in the nation. That year, Baltimore ranked 2<sup>nd</sup> in murder rate among these largest cities, and 5<sup>th</sup> in murder rate among the 207 cities with populations over 100,000.<sup>1</sup> Since 1990, murders in Baltimore annually have exceeded 300 in number. In 1999, 311 were slain. Baltimore’s murder rate today is over seven times the national average.

These crime statistics are disturbing, but the truth is even more alarming. A recent audit of 1999 Baltimore Police Department crime reports, guided and endorsed by the FBI’s Crime Analysis, Research and Development Unit, has concluded that UCR Part I crime in Baltimore last year –

Felony crime in 1999 was 15% higher than has been reported.

that is, serious felony crime – was actually 15% higher than reported.

The citizens of Baltimore want the police to move against crime, but do so with integrity and respect.

For the citizens of Baltimore, the threat of crime is pervasive. It has been estimated that, since 1991, 1,000 people move away from the City each month, most fleeing the fear of crime and the degradation in quality of life it precipitates. In focus group research commissioned by the newly elected Mayor in late 1999, 120 citizens of Baltimore were interviewed. All shared the belief that narcotics are at the root of violence in the City, and that shootings for control of drug trafficking turf and retaliatory killings are responsible for the high murder rate. Rampant witness intimidation by drug dealers has paralyzed most from cooperating with the police. With drug dealing so visible in their neighborhoods, many have suspected police complicity, at least by some officers.

The people of Baltimore are unequivocal in their expectations of the police. They want the police to move assertively against crime, but do so with integrity and respect for the dignity of citizens. They also want lines of communication between the police and the communities they serve established and kept open. Lack of communication today implies, for many, a lack of concern. This, and the persistence of high crime, have undermined the public's confidence in the Baltimore Police Department. And there is justification for this lost faith.

The BPD has been reactive, not proactive, in fighting crime.

The Baltimore Police Department, like most municipal police departments in the nation until the last few years, has been a department focused on 911 response with a centralized command-and-control structure. However, 911 policing is reactive to individual crimes and other individual citizen complaints, not proactive in crime prevention and solution. The failure of this 911 policy is evident in the

statistics. From 1960 to 1990, violent crime in America increased 13 times faster than the population.

Internal problems  
handicap the BPD in  
its crime-fighting  
mission.

Further handicapping efforts to control crime in Baltimore has been a set of serious problems that have beset the BPD for some years prior to the current administration.

- Management's focus on appearance instead of reality gave rise, for example, to only five officers pursuing offenders wanted for more than 50,000 warrants, including 250 individuals wanted for murder and other heinous crimes, while 88 positions were assigned to the PAL unit.
- Morale at all levels of the organization has been low stemming from discipline and rewards systems viewed as capricious and unfair, leading to a police culture characterized by cynicism and distrust.
- Unreliable and poorly designed data collection systems have produced misleading data and hindered operational effectiveness; statistics produced by one unit often contradict those produced by another unit.
- Low pay and the lack of clear career paths have led to growing attrition.
- A belief among officers that they will not be backed by the Department or the City has driven many otherwise highly dedicated officers to avoid proactive policing.
- Racial tensions that surfaced several years ago have not been resolved. For example, only 22.5% of African-American officers who responded to the Department-wide survey believe that all officers regardless of race

Racial tensions  
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have not been  
resolved.

are fairly treated by supervisors, compared to 59.6% of white officers.

Immediate  
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if crime is to be  
cut dramatically.

Inspired by the successes that cities such as New York, New Orleans, and Newark have had in dramatically reducing crime, the new Mayor recognized that immediate, drastic, and complete reform of the Baltimore Police Department was essential if the City were to hope for crime relief. “There is no agency more critical to the life of the City,” Mayor O’Malley has stated.

Since the start of the new administration, the BPD leadership has:

- streamlined the Command Staff and organizational structure creating clearer lines of accountability between officers and supervisors;
- launched on February 1 the Open-Air Drug Market Eradication Program targeting the ten largest drug markets for elimination within six months;
- moved 12 detectives from the Safe Neighborhood Initiative into Major Case Narcotics;
- ended Sector Management, the practice of dividing each District into distinct geographic areas, as a failed crime-reduction policy that had also muddled the command structure and alienated officers from one another within their own Districts; and
- initiated the process of auditing disciplinary cases, some open for three years or more, to clear a large backlog and improve officer morale.

Now, with this Plan of Action – which assesses the current crime-fighting readiness of the BPD, defines critical needs, and prescribes actions that will have measurable impact on the high levels of serious crime in Baltimore – the BPD command staff is accelerating reform of the Department and launching an all-out crusade against crime.

Acting Police Commissioner Edward T. Norris has underscored that this crusade will not be exactly like any other yet conducted in the history of the United States. “Baltimore is one of the most violent cities in the United States. It is also a city where many members of the general public have lost faith in the resolve, skill, and even integrity of their police. We will win the fight against crime while we win the hearts and minds and trust of the citizens we serve.”

Acting Commissioner Norris said this will be done by rebuilding the Baltimore Police Department from the ground up. “Police officers here have become as skeptical as people outside the Department that rapid change, systematically achieved, which respects the rights and needs of police officers in carrying out the difficult work they have, is even possible.”

Starting now, Norris said, Baltimore police officers will be

- managed relentlessly to become effective crime fighters;
- trained in the proper use of police tactics so that they become confident and respectful in doing their jobs; and
- supervised carefully and fairly so that officers know that high standards of behavior and effectiveness will be maintained throughout the agency at all times.

Police leaders have a sacred duty. We need to make sure police officers have the training they need to stay confident and the supervision they need to stay straight – so that they protect the innocent while capturing the guilty using nothing more than necessary force.  
– E.T. Norris

**Today, guided by this Plan of Action, the Baltimore Police Department commits itself to spearhead the most dramatic crime reduction in the City's history.**

**For the first time in years the Baltimore Police Department will hold itself accountable for measurable impact on crime, disorder, and public fear throughout every City neighborhood.**

This commitment is being made with confidence because the City and its people are galvanized to attack the scourge of crime, because the process by which this Plan of Action was developed involved all the sworn officers of the BPD, and because the vast majority of those men and women want to work tirelessly and assertively to get the job done.

This Plan was developed taking into account the opinions of citizens and most BPD officers.

Since November, more than 250 uniformed members and civilian employees of the BPD have been interviewed individually or in focus groups. Also, 120 members of the Baltimore community have been interviewed in focus groups, many of them representatives of neighborhood organizations. Based on these interviews, a 17-page questionnaire was developed and distributed to all members of the Department. Among sworn officers, 2,447, 81% of the active-duty force, completed and returned this questionnaire.

The survey findings are encouraging for the crime-fighting mission now underway.

*This is a police department that wants to take action as servants of the public and protectors of the peace.*

The top five of 25 police activities measured that officers feel are most important *to them* are:

1. Finding and apprehending perpetrators.
2. Making gun and shooting arrests.
3. Reducing crime, disorder, and fear.
4. Protecting and serving the people of Baltimore.
5. Arresting drug dealers.

BPD officers want to fight crime, and do it professionally and with high integrity.

*This is a police department that wants not only to improve its tarnished reputation, but also to serve as a beacon of integrity to all other law enforcement agencies.*

- 95% believe that the BPD should be the leading model of integrity for all other law enforcement agencies in Maryland.

*This is a police department in which the values most officers hold reflect a strong self-image that will motivate them under effective leadership to become outstanding public servants.*

- Integrity and Professionalism are two of the top six values held by BPD officers. These terminal values are most closely associated with accountability, and the high rankings observed bode well for the transformation of Department culture into a high performance organization.

But the BPD is an organization also mired in cynicism and distrust.

But this is a police department also that, through years of failed leadership and lack of support, has become mired in cynicism and distrust.

Vengeance  
characterizes the  
culture of the BPD.  
It must end.

**Long removed from its once proud reputation and achievements, the Baltimore Police Department now has an operating culture the instrumental values of which are individual survival, group loyalty, frustration, and resentment as needs and expectations have gone unfulfilled. Vengeance has appeared to many as the determinant in making personnel decisions. This culture of vengeance must end.**

Fairness and  
equality in  
treatment of  
officers will help  
transform the BPD  
culture into a high-  
performance  
organization.

Skepticism, indeed, characterizes the organizational culture of the BPD today, typically expressed in a “wait-and-see” attitude. However, the core professionalism and integrity of the force can be leveraged into a high-performance organization by the strong and focused leadership of the Police Commissioner. Leadership will need to continue to assert itself forcefully, rapidly, and systematically to undo years of practice that have created the operating culture in evidence.

*Fairness and equality* are the values of transformation for the Baltimore Police Department. Fairness and equality in the treatment of officers of all races, in holding officers to the high standards of professionalism and propriety, in leading the fight against crime on “every block of every street of every neighborhood” in Mayor O’Malley’s words.

By restoring fairness and equality, not only within the Department but in the treatment by the police of citizens, the Police Commissioner will transform the BPD into an exemplar of organizational effectiveness and institutionalize this achievement for its lasting benefit to the people of Baltimore in sustained low rates of crime.



But to succeed in the interlinked missions of crime reduction and accountability to the citizens of Baltimore, a number of critical actions must – and will – be taken in concert.

## **THE PLAN OF ACTION**

Starting immediately, and building upon the progress already achieved, the Baltimore Police Department is being restructured, refocused, and reengineered to attack the scourge of violent crime in the City.

With full implementation of this Plan, violent crime, including murder, will be cut dramatically in three years.

*With full and proper implementation of the actions set forth in this Plan, violent crime, including murder, will be dramatically reduced in three years.*

### ***Restructuring the BPD***

All enforcement and external investigative functions of the Baltimore Police Department, exclusive of IAD, are being centralized under the command of the Deputy Commissioner for Operations. The Criminal Investigation Division has been redesigned, with several units having been decentralized to District Commands to report to an Area Detective Squad Commander appointed by and answerable to the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division.

Many detectives are being decentralized to District Commands.

Remaining centralized in the Criminal Investigation Division at Headquarters are the following units: Homicide (to include Cold Cases, Kidnapping, Extortion), Child Abuse, Missing Persons, Sex Offenses, Auto Theft, Pawn Shop, Arson, Check and Fraud, and the Major Case Narcotics Section (to include the Asset Forfeiture and Vice

Units). The Warrant Apprehension Task Force, discussed in detail below, will also be centralized within the Criminal Investigation Division.

Investigators decentralized to District Commands will be charged with investigating robberies, burglaries, aggravated assaults, shootings, and drug crimes. All enforcement and investigative functions of the BPD are being placed under the command of the Deputy Commissioner for Operations.

The Warrant Squad  
is being increased  
by six-fold.

- A Warrant Apprehension Task force of 30 BPD officers, compared to the five previously assigned to serve warrants, is being formed to systematically hunt down over 54,000 wanted individuals, including the almost 250 wanted for murder or attempted murder. Cooperation with the Maryland Division of Corrections, Department of Parole and Probation, and Department of Juvenile Justice will be sought to improve access to all relevant intelligence on those under court-ordered supervision.
- District detectives will also be responsible for serving warrants and tracking down fugitives, as well as interviewing suspects arrested, in their geographical sectors.

District Commanders  
will be accountable  
for reducing crime in  
their Districts.

District Commanders are being granted necessary authority and resources to address crime and quality life issues and be held accountable for measurable crime reduction in their Districts. District Commanders will now become the key managers of the crime-fighting effort.

- Patrol and investigative personnel deployment needs are being redefined by District and by shift within each District based on:

- crime incidents, narcotics activity, and dispatched calls for service, and
- the increase in force strength at the District level resulting from decentralization of the Department.
- The use of 2-officer vehicles will be tested in high-crime Districts to increase officer safety and reduce the need for police backup, now estimated to consume about half of police patrol activity.
- Patrol supervisory deployment is being revised to maintain appropriate spans of control.
- Equipment, supply, and overtime budgets are being decentralized to the Districts.
- The U.S. Attorney has agreed to dramatically increase the number of federal prosecutions for those arrested with illegal weapons and ammunition.

New crime-fighting tactics will be employed.

New crime-fighting initiatives will be continuously designed to deal with murder, shootings, narcotics trafficking, armed and simple robbery, aggravated assault, domestic violence, burglary, auto theft, and quality of life violations. And actions are being taken to reduce the amount of time police spend on non-crime matters.

- Calls for service are being recoded to determine the exact nature of the apparently 75% of calls that are being answered by police for non-crime matters.
- Mayor O'Malley is proposing to City Council a new ordinance that will impose stiff fines on alarm monitoring companies, not their subscribers, for the innumerable false alarms reported to police.

## ***Resourcing the BPD***

The BPD must be brought to full enforcement strength as quickly as possible.

The enforcement strength of the Department is currently decimated. The Operations Bureau has, on paper, 2,992 positions allocated to it for patrol, investigations and other enforcement activity. But due to attrition (now running at nearly 30 per month), slow recruitment, medical leave, restricted duty assignments, and 88 positions reserved for PAL centers, the enforcement strength of the agency is just over 2,400 positions – a deficit of nearly 600 officers. In other words, as of March 24, 2000:

*Only 74% of the 3,274 officer positions funded by the City Council are available for enforcement duty on the streets of Baltimore.*

The following actions are being taken to correct this problem:

- The Deputy Commissioner for Administration will examine each position within the Bureau of Administration to reassign all capable officers to the street, eliminate unnecessary positions, and fill necessary non-enforcement positions with civilian personnel.
- Overtime will be deployed strategically to fill 911 response units to free regular officers for proactive crime fighting, until budgeted strength is fully achieved.
- The Deputy Commissioner for Administration will design and implement a program for aggressively monitoring the use of medical leave or restricted duty, to return capable officers to duty as rapidly as medically possible.

At the same time, the shrinking ranks of the BPD must be filled with new, highly qualified, dedicated crime-fighters.

### *Recruitment*

- The BPD will be brought to full enforcement strength through drastically accelerated recruiting and training.
  - The application process for becoming a BPD officer will be reengineered by the Deputy Commissioner for Administration with the goal of expediting the time between testing and hiring.
  - The Police Commissioner is reviewing recruitment screening criteria to ensure that standards are appropriate.
  - An expanded recruitment advertising and promotion campaign will be developed and implemented with the goal of attracting highly qualified, diverse candidates.
  - The Police Cadet program will be restarted, pending budgetary permission, to attract qualified candidates between the ages of 18-21 who want to become BPD officers.

### ***Refocusing the BPD***

BPD's patrol deployment has been geared primarily to responding to calls for service, the majority of which appear to have nothing to do with crime. Only cursory efforts have been given to intelligence gathering through interviewing

The immediate implementation of COMSTAT will drive accountability to the lowest appropriate levels of the BPD.

complainants and debriefing prisoners. Although rudimentary efforts in the CrimeStac process (Baltimore's version of COMSTAT) have been made at compiling statistics from arrests, field investigation reports, etc., this data has not been employed effectively to guide enforcement strategies and tactics, synchronize patrol, investigations, and narcotics activities, or hold personnel accountable for measurable crime reduction. One police officer in a December focus group recounted that he had started putting names of officers, instead of citizens, on his field interview cards. "No one ever said anything," he said. "Nobody reads these things [for the information on them], they just count them." Follow-up and assessment seem not to have been integral parts of the CrimeStac process.

Effective today, the implementation of the COMSTAT Accountability Process, replacing CrimeStac, will focus all operational Department units and personnel on the mandate and practice of crime reduction in the unique environment of Baltimore and hold each responsible for measurable crime reduction. A biweekly Administrative COMSTAT will make the Department's support units similarly data-driven in real time.

COMSTAT is based on four fundamental principles:

1. Accurate, timely intelligence communicated to all.
2. Rapid deployment which is synchronized and focused.
3. Effective tactics.
4. Relentless follow-up and assessment.

Weekly COMSTAT meetings are now being held to track crime and devise effective response tactics.

- Last week the nine District Commanders and their Detective Squad Commanders began meeting weekly with the Acting Police Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner for Operations, instead of once every four to six weeks as has been the practice, where they

are questioned on crime in their sectors, deployment strategies, pending investigations, investigative case clearances, and other matters of consequence to the crime-fighting mission.

- A system for daily reporting of District-level UCR and arrest data has been developed. This information will be mapped and examined at both District and Headquarters COMSTAT meetings.
- To ensure that accurate and timely intelligence is available to all, the BPD has invited to weekly COMSTAT meetings representatives from the Housing Police, the State's Attorney's Office, the Baltimore School Police Officers, and the Baltimore City Sheriff's Department.
- All Federal law enforcement agencies operating in Baltimore are being invited to the weekly COMSTAT meetings to discuss violent crime trends and enforcement actions.
- District Commander and Detective Commander Profile Sheets, which summarize key indicators of individual performance, have been developed. These tracking tools will be used to manage the performance of all crime-fighting units of the Department.

All BPD personnel and all units will be retrained on the mission of reducing crime.

### ***Reengineering the BPD***

Not only must day-to-day focus of all personnel and units be retrained on the mission of reducing crime, every system and procedure in the Department must be reengineered to reflect and support this mission. An essential aspect of this reengineering will be to ensure a new culture of fairness

and respect for all police officers and civilian personnel regardless of race, ethnicity, and gender. Unless this is done – and done quickly – the hope for change now being embraced by police officers will revert to cynicism and alienation that will harden beyond repair.

### *Disciplinary System*

- The Disciplinary Matrix developed several years ago to address the disparate impact of previous disciplinary practices has been universally denounced within the Department for removing all discretion on charging and penalties, inundating with trivial cases (thereby crippling) the Internal Investigations Division (now renamed the Internal Affairs Division) and reinforcing the sense among officers that it is far safer to take no action on the streets than to practice assertive policing.

The disciplinary system has been reengineered to return minor offenses to the commands for adjudication.

- The Disciplinary Matrix has been reengineered to return Category A – C offenses to the commands for investigation, penalty proffer and adjudication. This will cut by approximately two-thirds the caseload that has crippled the Internal Affairs Division in carrying out its mission of investigating allegations of serious police misconduct and corruption. Category D – F offenses will continue to be investigated by IAD, Traffic, or EEOC, as appropriate.
- The top penalties for Category A – C offenses are being reduced from four days loss of leave or pay to three days to enable the Department, under the requirements of Article 27, §727(d) of the Maryland Criminal Code to use single-member trial boards for these minor offenses.



- The FOP is being asked in current collective-bargaining discussions to reduce from four to one the number of “strikes,” or rejections of trial judges proposed by the Department, for Category A – C offenses. This, too, will streamline the process for these relatively minor violations.
- All reports of disciplinary violations, sustained or otherwise, will be referred to Legal Affairs for tracking of officer discipline.
- The Police Commissioner’s Inspections Unit will audit a sample of cases adjudicated within each command to make certain that supervisors are dealing fairly and equitably with their subordinates.
- Specific training in use of discretion and application of discipline will be provided to all commanders to ensure that disciplinary measures taken are consistent and uniform throughout the Department.
- A Reengineering Team, consisting of representatives from the FOP, Vanguard Society, Internal Affairs, Legal Affairs, Community Relations Commission, and Human Resources Division, will be formed to review the disciplinary process governing serious offenses to assure fairness and secure further simplification.

Internal Affairs will be reengineered to serve Baltimore citizens as guardian against police corruption and caretaker of high professional standards.

#### *Internal Affairs*

- Corruption can destroy a police department as crime destroys a city. And corruption, even by one officer, can destroy the public’s trust. A dedicated and proactive Internal Affairs Division will best serve the

citizens of Baltimore as a guardian against police corruption and a caretaker of high professional standards. The BPD's internal investigations unit must no longer be crippled by minor disciplinary cases, poor case tracking, lack of training, and misdirection.

- The citizen complaint intake system will be improved to ensure that all complaints against officers are received as recorded by the complainant.
- Citizen complaints against officers as well as officers involved in shootings and alleged assaults on police will be mapped for weekly review at Headquarters COMSTAT meetings.
- A system will be developed to monitor, and where necessary, discipline and retrain officers with multiple citizen complaints for abuse of force, abuse of authority, abridgment of civil rights, or acts of disrespect.
- IAD investigators will make arrests for narcotics violations and debrief those suspects for knowledge of police complicity.
- An audit capacity for compliance with policy is being established within the Inspections Unit.
- An Integrity Control Officer at the rank of Lieutenant will be appointed in each District to maintain the integrity of citizen complaints and monitor officer conduct.

Internal Affairs will conduct routine stings to root out police corruption.

- IAD will design and field proactive integrity tests, or stings, on both random and targeted bases to root out police corruption and deter police misconduct. This

will begin to deal with one of the most alarming findings in the Department survey of sworn personnel

- While 48.7% of respondents believe that 5% or less of BPD officers are stealing money or drugs from drug dealers, 23.2% believe the number is greater than a quarter of the Department.

### *Training*

All BPD officers will receive training to respond to the new demands of rapid crime reduction.

- Accountability can be demanded only if officers are adequately trained to perform the complex and sometimes dangerous responsibilities of their jobs.
  - Consultants and/or experienced personnel from other agencies will train District enforcement personnel in the use of the COMSTAT system.
  - Consultants and/or experienced personnel from other agencies will conduct Criminal Investigation Courses for all District and centralized detective units. These one-week courses will be conducted for 25 detectives each, and will start in May.
  - A task force to be named by the Acting Police Commissioner in April 2000, assisted as needed, will reengineer the training curriculum at all levels of an organization now dedicated to COMSTAT accountability and the measurable reduction of crime.
  - Specific training will be provided to all enforcement personnel in the use of deadly force to minimize the number of officer-involved shootings.

- Specific training will be provided to all officers on how to target and arrest wanted offenders in such a manner to minimize violence and threats to public and officer safety.
- Training will also be provided to all officers in stop and frisk procedures including the standards of reasonable suspicion and probable cause.

### *Inspections*

Crime reports will now be audited routinely for accuracy and integrity.

- An Inspections Unit is being established and will report directly to the Police Commissioner. One of its functions will be to ensure that crime reports are audited routinely for accuracy, thoroughness, and integrity, and matched with calls for service, to establish a reliable baseline for verified tracking of crime and law enforcement in Baltimore. Other functions will include: auditing the disciplinary system, monitoring officer appearance and effectiveness in court, checking phone courtesy of Department members, auditing confidential informant files and property-room process.

A technical response unit will be formed for electronic surveillance of criminal activity.

### *Technology*

- To improve the operating and investigative capabilities of the BPD, a new technical response unit will be formed during April 2000. This unit will be modeled on cutting-edge response units in other large cities. This unit will provide technical support by creating electronic surveillance capabilities – electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping, etc. – where none now exist in the BPD. The unit will be commanded by one of the nation's leading experts in this area.

New technology will be procured to provide connectivity and crime-fighting tools vital to effective policing.

- As technology advances, the BPD will upgrade or purchase new platforms and systems to maintain connectivity vital to effective policing today. Critical to the crime-fighting effort will be the procurement of:
  - correct and sufficient computer hardware and software networked among Districts and all units for foreseeable uses including real-time crime reporting and analysis, detective case management, and warrants tracking;
  - electronic pin-mapping in each District to record and track daily crime incidents, street by street, as an aid to identifying hot spots and developing effective enforcement tactics;
  - a police-oriented photo imaging system in all District commands to allow complainants and officers to search for suspects from the database of those with criminal records by description or MO as well as by name;
  - laptop computers or MDTs to be installed in marked police cruisers that will permit officers to check on wanted vehicles and persons almost immediately, and to general on-line criminal incident reports;
  - video camcorders for selected marked police cruisers to monitor and record officer conduct in engagements with suspects; and
  - an Automatic Vehicle Locator (AVL) system to enable Patrol Supervisors to track the exact locations of all officers in the field.

- An assessment of the basic data processing systems of the Department will be conducted to enable the agency to provide reliable and consistent reports on staffing, assignments, crime, calls for service, etc.

### *Performance Appraisals*

Performance appraisals will evaluate officer accountability for crime reduction.

- The semi-annual Performance Appraisal instrument for each rank will be modified to evaluate officer accountability for measurable crime reduction and, in the administrative units, for results-focused support efforts. All supervisors will be trained to evaluate performance using standardized and objective revised criteria. This will be accomplished by consultants working with internal personnel.

### *Promotional System*

Career advancement will be predicated on performance solely.

- To hone the crime-fighting edge of the BPD, foster professionalism, and bolster morale, it is imperative that officer talent and dedication are recognized through the promotional system. Officers must have a clear understanding that career opportunity is predicated on performance. To that end, consultants will work with internal personnel to redesign the criteria for promotion that will include use of the new performance appraisal instruments, fitness standards, commendations, etc. The Acting Police Commissioner will appoint of task force in April 2000 to propose a written career path grid for use throughout the agency.

### *Cultural Change Communications*

A cultural change program will define expectations, instill fairness and respect, and restore pride and professionalism.

Conscious, orchestrated effort must be undertaken to uproot the culture of vengeance and distrust, resolve racial divisions within the Department, and gain full-hearted commitment to the crime-fighting mission.

- The Acting Police Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner for Operations, and other members of the command staff will issue oral, written, and where necessary videotape communications to internal police and civilian officers to convey the facts of their assessments and the actions they are taking based on these assessments. These communications will be made to gain commitment to the Department's new mission of crime fighting effectively accomplished with respect for all citizens. These communications will also help construct a culture that instills fairness and respect, and inspires a restored sense of pride and professionalism.

The BPD will become transparent to the public so the people it serves can monitor police performance.

### *Public Accountability*

The Baltimore Police Department must become transparent to the public so the people of the City it serves will be able to monitor BPD performance.

- A program will be developed to disseminate to the public monthly and year-to-date crime statistics and other pertinent information on crime incidents and arrests in each District. Eventually this information will be placed on a web site so citizens have access to the crime maps being used by the Department.

### ***Rewarding the BPD***

A way will be sought to  
bring police officer  
compensation in line  
with surrounding  
jurisdictions.

Despite being faced with serious budget deficits, the Mayor is seeking a way for the City Council to approve police pay increases that will bring compensation into a competitive relationship with the Baltimore County Police Department.

**If the recommendations and actions set forth in this Plan are fully and quickly implemented, violent crime in Baltimore, including murder, will be dramatically reduced in two years.**

Full and proper implementation of this Plan of Action is imperative if Baltimore is to win the crusade against crime. At stake is the future of the City. The persistence of high crime can no longer be tolerated if Baltimore is to prosper in this new century. The investment to win is small compared to the benefits that will accrue to all from victory over ten years of high crime.



## CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN BALTIMORE

The implicit mission of any police agency is to reduce crime and preserve public order. The following review of crime and arrest trends, and of related enforcement issues, assesses the performance of the Baltimore Police Department in responding to this public mandate.

### Crime in Baltimore

In every serious  
crime category,  
Baltimore ranks  
near the top in the  
nation.

In 1998 – the latest year for which national statistics are available – among the 30 most populous cities, Baltimore ranked as the *second-most violent city in America*. When ranked by individual UCR crime,<sup>2</sup> Baltimore ranked:

- 2<sup>nd</sup> in homicide;
- 8<sup>th</sup> in rape;
- 1<sup>st</sup> in robbery; and
- 3<sup>rd</sup> in aggravated assault.

Among the 207 cities with population of 100,000 or more, Baltimore's violent crime rate ranked as the *eighth* most violent.

When Baltimore's 1998 property crime rates are compared among the 30 most populous cities, Baltimore had the *fifth* highest property crime rate. When ranked by individual UCR crime, Baltimore ranked:

- 4<sup>th</sup> in burglary;
- 4<sup>th</sup> in larceny theft; and
- 15<sup>th</sup> in auto theft.

Among the 207 cities with populations of 100,000 or more, Baltimore ranked 29<sup>th</sup> in total property crime rate.

A recently completed audit of the BPD's reported UCR crime totals, done in concert with the FBI, however, indicates that the totals for 1999 will be shifted higher or that the reductions recorded will not be as great as previously reported.

Although crime has been reported down in the last three years, an audit of 1999 crime reports reveals that crime actually may have increased during these years.

BALTIMORE UCR CRIME			
	<u>Incidents</u>	<u>% Change from Previous Year</u>	<u>% Change United States</u>
1989	71,373	+1.9%	+2.4%
1990	77,989	+9.3%	+1.6%
1991	85,068	+9.1%	+2.7%
1992	90,114	+5.9%	-2.9%
1993	91,920	+2.0%	-2.0%
1994	92,783	+0.9%	-1.1%
1995	94,855	+2.2%	-0.9%
1996	87,540	-7.7%	-2.8%
1997	77,600	-11.4%	-3.1%
1998	72,488	-6.6%	-7.0%
1999	65,507	-9.6%	n/a

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports

Baltimore has remained extremely consistent in maintaining high rates of over 300 murders for the last ten years. Much focus continues to be placed on the City's homicide totals. Murder is the most egregious of crimes and viewed by many as symptomatic of crime in general. Baltimore's homicide rate in 1998 was 5.1% higher than in 1990, bucking the national trend in which homicide rates declined

Over the past decade, the variance in murder rate between Baltimore and the nation has been steadily increasing.

36.2% over the same period. Currently, Baltimore's murder rate is *over seven times the national average*.

HOMICIDE RATES				United States
	<u>Baltimore</u>	<u>New York</u>	<u>New Orleans</u>	<u>Average</u>
1990	41.4	30.7	61.2	9.4
1991	40.6	29.3	68.9	9.8
1992	44.3	27.1	55.2	9.3
1993	48.2	26.5	80.3	9.5
1994	43.4	21.3	85.8	9.0
1995	45.6	16.1	74.5	8.2
1996	46.2	13.4	71.9	7.4
1997	43.4	10.6	54.7	6.8
1998	43.5	8.6	47.1	6.0
1999	43.2	9.1	33.2	n/a

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports, BPD, NYPD, NOPD

\*Rates per 100,000 population

### **African-Americans in Baltimore are Most Victimized by Murder**

African-Americans are far more likely to be murder victims than are whites.

Although all communities in Baltimore are victimized by crime, the murder rate in the African-American community is disproportionately higher compared to the white community. In 1996, the murder rate among African-Americans (murders per 100,000 population) was 88.3, six times higher than the rate among whites.<sup>3</sup> In 1999, 273 African-Americans were murdered compared to 26 whites.


### HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION BALTIMORE

	<u>African-Americans</u>	<u>Whites</u>	<u>% Difference</u>
1996	88.3	14.7	+600.6%
1997	82.6	13.3	+621.1%
1998	84.4	13.3	+634.6%
1999	81.7	11.9	+686.6%

Source: BPD

When the ages of the murder victims are considered, the differences in the Baltimore murder rates between African-Americans and whites become even more startling. Among the most victimized group, men aged 18-24 years old, the murder rate among African-Americans in 1999 reached its highest rate in the last several years.

### HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION RATES MALES, AGES 18-24



Source: BPD

Although the motives for most of these murders remain unclear, 58% of the murders in 1999 have been classified as “unknown,” it is widely believed that drugs are the engine driving the murder rate in Baltimore.

## Arrests

Better and more active enforcement can and will lead to dramatic reductions in crime. As crime then decreases, arrests, in the aggregate, will eventually decrease.

The trends in Baltimore exhibit elements of both trends with the exception of 1996, when arrests decreased concurrently with reported decreases in crime.

BPD TOTAL ARRESTS			
	<u>Number</u>	<u>ARRESTS</u> <u>% Change vs.</u> <u>Previous Year</u>	<u>UCR CRIMES</u> <u>% Change vs.</u> <u>Previous Year</u>
1994	117,821		+0.9%
1995	129,770	+10.1%	+2.2%
1996	110,730	-14.7%	-7.7%
1997	129,184	+16.7%	-11.4%
1998	140,029	+8.4%	-6.6%
1999	133,376	-4.8%	-9.6%

Source: BPD, FBI Uniform Crime Reports

A full comparison of the crimes-arrests trends including 1999 figures cannot be done with accuracy as the UCRs for 1999 are being recalculated as the result of the recently completed audit.

With the exception of 1998, arrests for UCR offenses have steadily declined since 1995. In fact, UCR arrests for 1999 are 50.4% fewer than in 1995.

Arrests in 1999 for serious crimes were half the number of arrests in 1995.

BPD UCR ARRESTS			
	<u>Number</u>	<u>ARRESTS % Change vs. Previous Year</u>	<u>UCR CRIMES % Change vs. Previous Year</u>
1994	25,605		+0.9%
1995	26,052	+1.7%	+2.2%
1996	17,722	-32.0%	-7.7%
1997	13,940	-21.3%	-11.4%
1998	14,786	+6.0%	-6.6%
1999	12,931	-12.5%	-9.6%

Source: BPD, FBI Uniform Crime Reports


Arrests for serious crimes as a percentage of total arrests have declined for the fifth straight year.

Furthermore, UCR arrests as a percentage of total arrests have declined for the fifth straight year.

BPD ARRESTS UCR ARRESTS VS. TOTAL ARRESTS			
	<u>UCR Arrests</u>	<u>Total Arrests</u>	<u>% UCR</u>
1994	25,605	117,821	21.7%
1995	26,052	129,770	20.1%
1996	17,722	110,730	16.0%
1997	13,940	129,184	10.8%
1998	14,786	140,029	10.6%
1999	12,931	133,376	9.7%

Source: BPD, FBI Uniform Crime Reports

By further disaggregating the non-UCR arrest figures, a pattern begins to emerge: whereas total arrest figures have ultimately increased since 1994, the totals for arrests categorized as “other,” or non-violent offenses, have risen 239% during the same period. Conversely, arrests for serious, yet non-UCR crimes have declined. These crimes were identified by citizens of Baltimore who participated in the focus groups as emblematic of the nature of the crime problem in Baltimore.



Source: BPD

Based on the above graph and the decreasing totals of arrests for UCR offenses, it appears that BPD officers are either not placing enough priority on arresting violent

According to the Department survey, over three-quarters of officers avoid arresting criminals near the end of their shift.

offenders, or are not doing so for other reasons. One reason may be found in the results of the Department survey: over three quarters of officers responding, 77.5%, believe that most BPD officers avoid arresting criminals near the end of their shift because of the long waiting lines at the Central Booking Intake Facility (CBIF). This possibility, along with others, will be discussed further in the next chapter and the Cultural Diagnostic.

### Assaults on Police Officers

In 1999, assaults on police officers rose almost 10%, but have declined nearly 35% from 1995, the highest total in recent years.

BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT ASSAULTS ON POLICE OFFICERS		
	<u>Number</u>	<u>% Change vs. Previous Year</u>
1994	1,430	
1995	1,582	+10.6%
1996	1,132	-28.5%
1997	1,232	+8.8%
1998	943	-23.5%
1999	1,033	+9.5%

Source: BPD

The trend of assaults on police officers may have some relationship to the number of arrests, rising or falling, as police interact with suspects more or less. Here, the trends for assaults and arrests are similar, with the exception of



1998 and 1999. But more revealing, assaults as a percentage of arrests have steadily decreased since 1995 with only a slight increase in 1999.

Assaults on officers as a percentage of arrests have generally been decreasing.

BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT ASSAULTS VS. ARRESTS			
	% Change vs. Previous Year		Assaults as
	<u>Assaults</u>	<u>Arrests</u>	<u>% of Arrests</u>
1994	1,430	117,821	1.21%
1995	1,582	129,770	1.22%
1996	1,132	110,730	1.02%
1997	1,232	129,184	0.95%
1998	943	140,029	0.67%
1999	1,033	133,376	0.77%

Source: BPD

It has been theorized that the incidence of reported assaults on officers, to some degree, is correlative of the incidence of force employed by officers in making an arrest. Not only may use of force trigger a reaction in kind, some officers who are compelled to use force to subdue suspects are believed to claim assault to justify their use of force against a suspect. Documenting an assault is one method officers can hope to defend themselves from complaints of physical abuse or brutality. This may account for the increase in officer assaults in those years where arrests have increased, with the exception of 1999.

Baltimore police officers, at least 82.3% of survey respondents, believe that the public thinks the police use more force than necessary in dealing with suspects. On the

other hand, 93.9% of officers believe that BPD officers *do not* use more force than necessary.

Officers do understand that their behavior during an arrest can determine how violent the incident will be: 83.9% said that officers who show disrespect for people they question or arrest may thereby cause unnecessary escalation of force. However, barely half of police officers surveyed believe they know how to prevent such encounters: only 57.6% agreed that most officers have the verbal and tactical skills necessary for deescalating a potentially violent encounter. This and other training needs will be discussed further in Chapter 3.

### Calls For Service

Dispatched calls for service (CFS) provide a good indicator of changes in the demand placed on police personnel and resources.<sup>4</sup> On the whole, dispatched calls for service have declined somewhat every year, with the exception of 1998. In 1999, there were 8.0% fewer dispatched calls for service than in 1995.

The number of 911 calls each year has been generally declining since 1995.

BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT DISPATCHED CALLS FOR SERVICE		
	<u>Number</u>	<u>% Change from Previous Year</u>
1995	1,130,361	
1996	1,105,536	-2.2%
1997	1,066,813	-3.5%
1998	1,096,884	+2.8%
1999	1,042,386	-5.0%

Source: BPD

In 1999, there were about 16 fewer calls per officer than in 1995, a decrease of 4.3%.

BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT		
	<u>Total</u> <u>Officers</u>	<u>Number of</u> <u>Calls per Officer</u>
1995	3,010	375.5
1996	3,093	357.4
1997	3,021	353.1
1998	3,025	362.6
1999	2,900*	359.4

\*As of March 18, 2000

Source: BPD

Of course, not all BPD officers respond to or initiate calls for service. At the end of 1999, only 70% were officers or supervisors in patrol assignments. For these responding officers, the average yearly workload increased to 513.2 calls per officer.

The BPD has been preoccupied with 911 response at the expense of crime prevention and solution.

However, this average yearly number still understates the demand on a patrol officer's time: calls for service and the CAD system does not count calls for backup. To obtain a better understanding of a routine patrol officer's day, a random audit was conducted of officers' run sheets – the end of tour reports by which officers account for their activities. This audit revealed that calls for backup and officer assistance often consumed the majority of patrol officers' time. When calls for backup are combined with other calls for service, the result is officers spend most of their time running from call to call, thereby leaving little time for proactive crime solving and prevention. The BPD

today can be characterized as an agency that is reactive rather than proactive in fighting crime.

Increasingly, a vast majority of calls to the BPD concern matters less serious than UCR Index crimes.


Only about 6% of 911 calls concern felony crime incidents.

BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT INDEX CRIMES AS % OF CFS	
1995	8.4%
1996	7.9%
1997	7.3%
1998	6.6%
1999	6.3%

Source: BPD

Only about 25% of 911 calls are even crime related.

Furthermore, only about 25% of all calls for service are crime-related, that is, calls for service that result in a criminal incident report being generated.



Source: BPD

10% of 911 calls  
are burglar alarms,  
and 98% of these  
are false alarms.

Indeed, the BPD, with its policy of responding to all 911 calls, is preoccupied with a high number of non-emergency calls. Included in these non-emergency calls are false burglar alarms. As police must respond to every alarm call, continued false alarms drain and debilitate police resources. Currently, false burglar alarms constitute 97.8% of total alarm calls. The total number of yearly false alarm calls has risen 27.5% over the same period.

BPD BURGLAR ALARMS VS. CALLS FOR SERVICE				
	<u>Total Alarm Calls</u>	<u>Total False Alarms</u>	<u>% False Alarms</u>	<u>Total Alarms as % of CFS</u>
1995	104,124	101,565	97.5%	7.3%
1996	119,426	116,528	97.6%	9.1%
1997	130,110	127,217	97.8%	10.2%
1998	133,913	131,051	97.9%	10.2%
1999	132,296	129,476	97.8%	10.3%

Source: BPD

The State of Maryland has enacted a law whereby owners of burglar alarms are fined \$30 for every false alarm responded to by the Police after , but the BPD has not tracked its enforcement of this law.

Another non-emergency category is listed as administrative calls for service. Administrative dispatches are not calls received through 911 but are codes (or “calls”) entered into the system for when an officer is taken out of service. These “calls” include such activities as transporting suspects to Central Booking, transporting materials and paperwork from one District to another (including Headquarters), having repairs or service done on a patrol vehicle, and responding to a request to appear in court, among others. Administrative calls obviously remove officers from availability for patrol and increase the workload of those officers who now must cover for out-of-service officers.

Although down since 1995, the number of administrative calls has averaged nearly 20% of total calls over the last five years.

BPD CALLS FOR SERVICE			
	<u>Admin. Calls</u>	<u>Total Calls*</u>	<u>% Admin.</u>
1995	302,131	1,432,492	21.1%
1996	294,298	1,399,834	21.0%
1997	268,491	1,335,304	20.1%
1998	261,540	1,358,424	19.3%
1999	269,796	1,312,182	20.6%

\*Total Calls includes all dispatched calls for service plus administrative calls.  
Source: BPD

911 calls have never been evaluated with the goal of cutting police response to non-crime situations.

Calls for service data has never been evaluated with the goal of cutting the number of police responses to non-crime related situations. Nor have calls reporting UCR crimes and incident reports of UCR crimes been historically cross-checked to evaluate the degree of correlation between them.

By focusing on the reduction of non-emergency calls, the BPD will improve the quality of service to the citizens of Baltimore.

### **Perceptions and Attitudes of the People of Baltimore**

123 citizens from Baltimore were interviewed in 13 focus groups conducted in November and December 1999.<sup>5</sup> They were from neighborhoods representing all nine police districts in the City, all City Council Districts, as well as all age groups. In total, 70% of participants were African-American, 20% were White, and 10% were other minorities; 60% were women and 40% were men. Most either had been victims of crime or had family, friends or

neighbors who were victims, although these were not criteria in screening. Most participants represented neighborhood groups or business associations whose aggregate membership totaled in the thousands.

Perhaps no other statistic has occupied the residents of Baltimore more than the City's high and largely unchanged murder rate. The media has focused intense attention on each homicide such that nearly every homicide reported in the press includes the current yearly homicide tally, the tally for the same period of the previous year, *and* projected totals for the remainder of the current year. This has increased the sense of urgency for the City of Baltimore and the Baltimore Police Department to reduce the number of murders in the City.

For the citizens of  
Baltimore,  
regardless where  
they live, the threat  
of crime is pervasive.

For the people of Baltimore represented by the focus group participants, the threat of crime throughout the City, regardless of the neighborhood, remains ever present. To varying degrees, all feel hostage to high crime. All believe that drugs are at the root of the murder rate in the City of Baltimore. Shootings for control of drug trafficking areas and retaliatory killings, in their opinion, all contribute to the high murder rate in the City. In addition, they believe that rampant witness intimidation by drug dealers and other criminals makes them fear for their safety.

They further acknowledge that witness intimidation hampers police efforts to locate murder suspects and hinders prosecution efforts to convict those who are arrested. Said one participant, "I'll call the police but I'm not going to testify." About a third of participants hold the perception that the citizens who are the most active in calling the police end up as targets, either by drug dealers or by the police themselves.



Many citizens question the resolve of the BPD to fight crime.

For some participants, continued calls to the police to report crimes result in less frequent police response. If the police do arrive, said these participants, the police appear more concerned with making the caller feel at ease than with trying to find and arrest criminals. These participants believe the police have become reluctant in their desire to fight crime.

Participants believe most citizens do not want to be identified, and they are displeased with those police officers who respond to the person making the call – thus identifying them to the criminals – rather than responding to the crime scene. Furthermore, these participants believe that officers who respond to the caller rather than dealing with the criminals expose the caller to greater danger from the criminals. In addition to their fears of being identified to drug dealers, several participants said that in order to get police response, they had to over-state the nature of the crime being committed to get any police response at all. Several other participants recounted instances when they called 911 and reported a crime only to have the dispatcher tell them that what they were calling for was not a crime. Still others recounted instances where they felt as though the dispatcher was upset with them for calling to report a crime. This fear of being mistreated by dispatchers, although infrequent in occurrence said participants, has prevented some citizens from calling the police.

The greatest concern of citizens is the BPD's seeming inability to control drug trafficking on the streets.

Citizens in the focus groups are well aware of the open-air drug markets that plague the City and many listed dangerous areas near their homes. The greatest concern of citizens revolves around what appear to them to be the police department's inability to eradicate these markets. Many participants recounted instances where they had seen police drive by drug deals in progress without any attempt to stop and arrest those involved. To some participants,

The visibility of drug dealing on the streets has led many citizens to suspect police complicity.

the perception is one of “They see it, we know they see it, and yet they do nothing about it.” One participant remarked how she had called the police over 20 times to arrest known drug dealers in front of her house and the police still did not appear. She stated that she finally asked the dealers politely to move away from her house and go down the street. In addition, several participants remarked how they had become fluent in the language of the drug trade due to the uncontrolled dealing in their neighborhoods. More alarming, according to these participants, is that their children have become well versed in this language, increasingly at younger ages.

The participants were then asked if they thought the police were taking money or drugs from the dealers. Although no participant had first-hand knowledge of any such police corruption, many believed it to be occurring. The perception is one of “Since they are not stopping [the drug dealing], they must have some reason [i.e., profiting] for letting [the drug dealing] continue.” This perception has eroded the faith of many citizens in the ability of the police to take back the streets from the drug dealers.

Many focus group participants appeared conversant about some internal BPD issues, especially about policies and salaries. Most participants acknowledged that BPD officers are not paid well relative to surrounding police jurisdictions and this hampers the ability of the BPD to hire and retain police officers. However, some participants held the opinion that police officers are not working hard enough for what they are being paid now.

Focus group participants were critical of the now-defunct rotation policy, citing it as an example of poor police management. Some participants did not understand how rotating officers into new assignments, just as the officers

were getting to know the neighborhoods and they were getting to know the officers, contributed to the concepts of community policing. Furthermore, this policy, according to many participants, also prevented the enactment of any long-term strategies because District Commanders would be rotated out before anything could be done. Without any applied direction or focus, said participants, the police have become “lackadaisical” in their efforts.

Participants favored the practice of sector management and approved of its ostensible purpose of having Lieutenants more in contact with neighborhoods. However, several participants noted that this now-defunct practice was hindered by the rotation policy and was not truly effective in making a difference against crime in their sectors.

Citizens complain that the police are often insensitive to the communities they serve.

Many participants noted what they perceive to be a lack of concern for communities on the part of the police. According to these participants, this has resulted in policing tactics that have had the effect of weakening police-community bonds.

Participants noted for example, that police often break up groups of people who are simply talking on the street. According to these participants, a group of African-Americans talking on the street means to the police that something bad is bound to happen. According to these participants, the police seem to believe that several people in a group may indicate criminal activity such as drug dealing. As a result, said these participants, people tend to avoid gathering on the street. Several participants recounted how they and other citizens would stop talking and disperse so as to keep the police from coming over to them, if the police were nearby. Said one participant, “in the old days, they [the City] used to put basketball hoops in the schoolyards so kids would gather and have something

to do. Nowadays, they take the hoops out to prevent anything bad from happening.”

While focus group participants possessed good knowledge about the internal practices of the police department, many were confused about why those practices were in place. The most oft-cited example of a misuse of police officers was the Police Athletic League program. Many participants felt that while PAL was a good program to have in place, they questioned the use of police officers to run the centers. Most participants who raised this issue believed that running these centers should be a Parks and Recreation function and not a BPD function. Said one participant, “you’ve got two or three cops keeping the inside of the [PAL] center crime-free, and two or three people dealing dope outside the center, no more than 100 feet away, and the cops can’t leave the center to arrest them.”

Citizens want the police to move assertively against crime, but do so with integrity and respect for civil rights.

The citizens of Baltimore are unequivocal in their demands for better police performance. They want the police to move assertively against crime, but do so with integrity and respect for civil rights. Although many participants expressed some reservation over the potential abuse with assertive, proactive policing, they believed that crime fighting could be done with care and concern for protecting innocent citizens.

Citizens also want communication established between the police and the communities they serve.

Citizens also want the lines of communication between the police and the communities they serve improved and kept open. Citizens also perceive a lack of communication between neighborhoods and the Department. As one example, several participants recounted how their association had tried to obtain maps of criminal incidents only to be told by District officers that such maps do not exist. For these group participants, such responses imply

lack of concern by the police for the public's issues which undermines the respect that citizens have for the police.

Perhaps the most encouraging finding from the focus group interviews was a renewed sense of hope and optimism for the future of Baltimore. Almost all expressed hope and confidence that the new city administration would succeed in dramatically reducing the scourge of drug dealing and homicide in the city.

### **Economic and Social Consequences of High Crime**

Because of high crime, Baltimore today is one of the nation's poorest, most rapidly declining cities.

The ravages of high crime extend far beyond its victims. High crime is a cancer on the community it infests, eating away at its very life force. And Baltimore is severely ailing and at critical risk. The *Baltimore Economic Digest*, in its summer 1999 quarterly issue, diagnosed Baltimore today as "...one of the nation's poorest, most rapidly declining cities."

Although no recent studies have been uncovered that directly link high crime in Baltimore and its attendant fear with the City's economic and social decline, a close connection is self-evident. The statistics tell the tale most compellingly.

- Between 1990 and 1998, Baltimore ranked second among the nation's major cities in population loss. Since its historic census peak in 1950, the City has lost a third of its population, about 300,000 people.

— U.S. Census

- Since 1991, over 1,000 people each month on average leave Baltimore to live elsewhere, the equivalent of 15 households per day.

– U.S. Census, Projections

- By “...hemorrhaging jobs in addition to residents, Baltimore is also losing its primary function in the regional economy,” stated the *Baltimore Economic Digest*. In nine years (1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 1989 to 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 1998), Baltimore lost about one-sixth of its employment base.

– Maryland Department of Labor

- As a result of continuing out-migration, the City now contains over 11,000 vacant homes defining scores of blighted neighborhoods.

– *Baltimore Economic Digest*, Summer 1999

- Only 199 new homes were under construction in 1999 in Baltimore compared with 12,354 new homes in the five-county region surrounding the City.

– Maryland Association of Realtors

- The average price of a residential home in Baltimore in 1999 declined 1.4% from the previous year, compared to an average 3.7% increase state-wide.

– Maryland Association of Realtors

- The average rent for a residential unit in Baltimore in 1999 grew only 2.2% compared to a 10.3% growth in the northern suburbs (West and Northwest Baltimore County) and 5.1% growth for the southern suburbs (Anne Arundel and Columbia Counties).

– Delta Association, 12/31/99

- Baltimore ranks first among major cities in the nation in hospital emergency room admissions involving drugs.

– *Baltimore Economic Digest*, Summer 1999

- Population and business flight from Baltimore has undermined the tax base leaving the City with a \$153 million revenue shortfall over the next four years to fund municipal services.

Baltimore today is a city in crisis. High crime can no longer be tolerated if the City is to revive.

These facts are symptomatic of a city in crisis. And at its root are high crime and the degradation in quality of life it breeds. To be fifth in murder rate among the 207 largest cities in the nation, to be second in violent crime rate among the 30 largest cities, cannot be tolerated by anyone who loves this City and cares about its future.

Surely, the renaissance of downtown Baltimore is a proud first step toward the City's revival. But the positive real estate trends that mirror this turnaround are limited to the city blocks surrounding downtown's epicenter, the Inner Harbor. What positive notice Baltimore receives today and what positive trends are reported are mostly for the metropolitan region. Today, Baltimore County is the region's leader in both population and jobs. To heal the City of Baltimore, the region's heart historically and culturally, to restore it to rightful leadership, to bring back prosperity and quality of life for all who live and work here, crime must be reduced, and reduced dramatically and rapidly.

## **CURRENT PRACTICES OF THE BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT**

The commitment of Mayor O'Malley and the Police Commissioner to transform the Baltimore Police Department into a high-performance organization offers great opportunity, not just for the citizens of Baltimore, but for every sworn police officer who yearns for strong leadership that will restore professionalism, fairness and respect to the Department. For the first time in years, this Police Department will hold itself accountable for measurable impact on crime, disorder, and public fear throughout the City of Baltimore.

But to succeed in this mission, a number of serious organizational obstacles must be overcome.

### **Department Organization**

Because of a  
centralized  
command-and-  
control structure,  
the BPD has been  
reactive, not  
proactive in fighting  
crime.

Historically, the Department has been administratively top-heavy and overly specialized in light of staffing levels. Past structures of the BPD have not facilitated a Department-wide strategic operation. The centralized command and control style of policing, which reacts to crime incidents rather than preventing crime, led to the creation of specialized units with specialized functions. In some cases, new units were created to oversee the operations of other units; still other units had functions and responsibilities removed and placed in new units. This practice of increasing the delegation of authority while decreasing the amount of responsibility for the new supervisors served to clutter the chain of command and decrease accountability within the organization. The organizational charts that follow provide evidence of this trend.







The command staff has been streamlined by reestablishing two Deputy Commissioner positions previously eliminated. Instead of eight Colonels reporting directly to the Police Commissioner along with five additional unit commanders, five Colonels will now report directly to the Deputy Commissioners who in turn will report to the Police Commissioner. Steps have also been taken towards the decentralization of most detectives to District Commands.

Four separate units will report directly to the Police Commissioner because they are specialized units that require high degrees of executive control – Internal Affairs Division, the newly-formed Inspections Unit, Legal Affairs Unit, and Public Affairs Unit. The remainder of the department will report directly to one of the two Deputy Commissioners.

The organization charts that follow delineate the redesigned Department as proposed, and the Criminal Investigations Division of the Operations Bureau, reflecting the proposed decentralization.





## Department Operations

### *Force Strength*

BPD enforcement strength today is just 74% of authorized strength.

Although as of March 24, 2000 there were 3,274 funded officer positions in the BPD, the actual enforcement strength – the number of officers currently assigned to the Operations Bureau – is much lower. Enforcement strength has been reduced by the 205 current vacancies in the Bureau, and by the 76 officers still assigned to the PAL program. As of March 24, 2000 the Operations Bureau had 180 of its assigned officers either on short-term and long-term medical leave or permanently reassigned to limited or light duty. These factors have further reduced the enforcement strength of the BPD to 2,429 officers, or 74% of the authorized force strength.

BPD FORCE STRENGTH*			
	<u>Authorized Strength</u>	<u>Enforcement Strength</u>	<u>Difference</u>
2000	3,274	2,890	-384
PAL	(-76)	2,814	-460
Vacancies	(-205)	2,609	-665
Medical	(-180)	2,429	-845

\*As of March 24, 2000

The personnel shortage in the Administration Bureau is more than that of the Operations Bureau. The Administrative Bureau has 20 of its 204 officer positions vacant and 42 officers (as of March 24, 2000) are on

medical leave or assigned to limited or light duty. The remaining 75 positions are assigned to those executive units reporting directly to the Police Commissioner; currently there are 27 vacancies in these units. On the plus side, the BPD currently has 102 recruits in various stages of their training to become active BPD officers. However, this does not yet increase the current enforcement strength of the BPD. Counting recruits then, the BPD has 255 positions vacant and 222 officers on short-term and long-term medical leave or assigned to light duty, for a total force reduction of 15%.

### *Patrol Operations*

There has been no  
crime analysis or  
effective  
monitoring of crime  
trends by the BPD.

As the BPD shifted, with the rest of America's police departments, to focus on reactive policing, some core police capabilities have atrophied – including follow-up of criminal activity, debriefing of prisoners, and interviewing complainants. In recent years District commands have become reactive to the loudest of locally voiced public concerns while they have attempted to answer all 911 calls – criminal as well as non-emergency in nature. Patrol officers have had their mission changed from week to week, focusing on the latest problem to have management's attention. As revealed by the audit discussed later in this chapter, crime reports have not been accurately completed. There has been no strategic crime analysis performed, crime mapping has not been fully utilized, and there has been little, if any, discussion about crime trends in commands or during roll calls.

Furthermore, crime discussions at headquarters have not been extended systematically to District commands. There have not been systematic discussions of crime trends at roll calls, or with supervisory staff. Similarly, the specialized

There has been little coordination among units or between the Districts and centralized units.

units in the Districts have not been coordinated cross-functionally, leaving each unit to act in isolation from regular patrol duties. The District-based investigative units have not been coordinating with centralized units at headquarters, essentially acting autonomously, and in some instances pursuing the same cases.

### *Patrol Deployment*

Staff shortages handicap effective patrol deployment.

Patrol deployment is geared primarily toward answering calls for service. However, according to District Commanders, the current staff shortages place serious burdens on them to fill each shift. Many times, the shift supervisors must use overtime to satisfy minimum staffing needs. While many of the officers stated they are willing and do work overtime, in their opinions, the constant need to fill patrol shifts has left officers feeling overworked.

Many officers do not believe that the current deployment strategy is effective: 81.3% of officers responding to the survey agreed that personnel and equipment are not deployed to have maximum impact on crime in the City of Baltimore. Likewise, when asked what changes to the department officers would make if they could, “change deployment/restructure department” was the second-most listed response.

Historically, the Department has apportioned patrol officers based on the number of incidents occurring in each District. Despite changes in the number of incidents in each District between 1995 and 1999, the percentage of officers assigned to each District has remained relatively constant. The figures for patrol officers are those assigned to each of the nine Districts; Traffic, Tactical and officers



There is disparity between allocation of sworn personnel and demand for service by District that needs to be corrected to balance workload.

assigned to the Chief's Office are excluded as they do not respond to CFS.

In addition the UCR crime incident data for 1999 are misleading as they are based on the pre-audit totals.

BPD UCR INDEX CRIME – ALL CATEGORIES  
BY POLICE DISTRICT

	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999*</u>
Central	13,735	14,947	12,990	12,954	11,100
% of UCR incidents	15.1%	17.3%	15.7%	16.9%	16.0%
% patrol officers*	12.2%	12.2%	12.0%	12.4%	12.3%
Southeastern	9,566	10,379	9,433	9,376	8,360
	10.5%	12.0%	11.4%	12.3%	12.1%
	9.6%	9.4%	9.4%	9.5%	9.4%
Eastern	10,814	10,449	8,151	7,226	6,247
	11.9%	12.1%	9.9%	9.5%	9.0%
	10.3%	10.2%	11.5%	10.4%	10.3%
Northeastern	10,618	11,620	10,823	9,437	8,250
	11.7%	13.5%	13.1%	12.3%	11.9%
	8.9%	8.9%	9.3%	9.4%	9.6%
Northern	11,109	11,267	9,426	8,901	8,514
	12.2%	13.1%	11.4%	11.6%	12.3%
	10.9%	10.8%	10.7%	10.8%	10.8%
Northwestern	10,321	10,327	8,634	7,927	7,417
	11.4%	12.0%	10.5%	10.4%	10.7%
	9.5%	10.1%	9.4%	9.3%	9.3%
Western	7,429	7,885	6,523	5,914	5,484
	8.2%	9.1%	7.9%	7.7%	7.9%
	9.1%	9.0%	9.2%	9.4%	9.3%
Southwestern	7,643	8,435	7,716	6,643	6,146
	8.4%	9.8%	9.3%	8.7%	8.9%
	8.9%	9.0%	9.2%	9.3%	9.5%
Southern	9,770	9,776	8,908	8,081	7,776
	10.8%	11.3%	10.8%	10.6%	11.2%
	10.4%	10.6%	10.1%	10.2%	10.2%

\*1999 total incidents reflect the yearly pre-audit reported incidents.

Source: BPD

Similarly, changes in calls for service patterns have not resulted in large changes in the allocation of manpower at the District level.

BPD CALLS FOR SERVICE PERCENTAGE BY POLICE DISTRICT					
	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>
Central % of CFS	13.0%	12.6%	12.4%	12.4%	12.8%
% patrol officers	12.2%	12.2%	12.0%	12.4%	12.3%
Southeastern	10.3%	10.1%	10.5%	10.8%	10.9%
	9.6%	9.4%	9.4%	9.5%	9.4%
Eastern	13.6%	13.8%	13.7%	13.8%	12.0%
	10.3%	10.2%	11.5%	10.4%	10.3%
Northeastern	10.3%	10.2%	10.7%	10.9%	11.0%
	8.9%	8.9%	9.3%	9.4%	9.6%
Northern	10.7%	10.3%	10.1%	10.1%	10.3%
	10.9%	10.8%	10.7%	10.8%	10.8%
Northwestern	11.1%	11.7%	11.6%	11.3%	11.1%
	9.5%	10.1%	9.4%	9.3%	9.3%
Western	9.9%	10.0%	10.0%	9.8%	9.9%
	9.1%	9.0%	9.2%	9.4%	9.3%
Southwestern	10.2%	10.7%	10.8%	10.8%	11.2%
	8.9%	9.0%	9.2%	9.3%	9.5%
Southern	11.1%	10.5%	10.2%	10.1%	10.6%
	10.4%	10.6%	10.1%	10.2%	10.2%

Source: BPD

When violent crime incidents alone are considered relative to manpower allocation, similar disparities result.

BPD UCR VIOLENT CRIME INCIDENTS PERCENTAGE BY POLICE DISTRICT					
	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999*</u>
Central % UCR VC	13.3%	13.2%	11.8%	12.0%	12.1%
% patrol officers	12.2%	12.2%	12.0%	12.4%	12.3%
Southeastern	9.2%	9.2%	10.5%	10.8%	11.3%
	9.6%	9.4%	9.4%	9.5%	9.4%
Eastern	17.2%	15.0%	13.3%	13.4%	13.2%
	10.3%	10.2%	11.5%	10.4%	10.3%
Northeastern	9.7%	10.9%	11.7%	10.1%	10.4%
	8.9%	8.9%	9.3%	9.4%	9.6%
Northern	8.6%	8.6%	10.0%	8.7%	9.8%
	10.9%	10.8%	10.7%	10.8%	10.8%
Northwestern	11.6%	11.3%	11.4%	11.3%	12.4%
	9.5%	10.1%	9.4%	9.3%	9.3%
Western	11.7%	12.3%	11.9%	12.1%	11.7%
	9.1%	9.0%	9.2%	9.4%	9.3%
Southwestern	7.9%	9.7%	10.4%	9.9%	9.0%
	8.9%	9.0%	9.2%	9.3%	9.5%
Southern	10.8%	9.9%	10.0%	9.5%	10.0%
	10.4%	10.6%	10.1%	10.2%	10.2%

\*1999 total incidents reflect the yearly pre-audit reported incidents.

Source: BPD

Manpower at the Districts has not been reallocated in over ten years, and as the above tables demonstrate, there is a

need to reallocate personnel to balance workload between Districts.

For every 911 call,  
officers respond to  
nearly four calls for  
backup.

Inherent in the current deployment strategy is the use of one-officer police cars to respond to 911 calls. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this Plan, officers spend most or all of their time responding to calls for service. A random audit of patrol officer run sheets found that officers spend a great deal of time – nearly four calls per every 911-generated call – providing assistance or backup to fellow officers. This is a great consumption of manpower and patrol resources. When probed in focus groups on this topic, most patrol officers stated that due to high levels of violent crime in the City most situations required the presence of more than one officer. Some officers believe that the Department's continued use of one-officer cars places officers' lives at risk. These officers perceive that this is not a concern of the command staff, and the survey supports this perception: 60.7% of officers responding to the survey agree that the BPD command staff does not care a great deal about the safety of police officers. A change to two-officer cars will alleviate fears of officer safety by immediately placing two officers at every scene. Similarly, implementing a two-officer vehicle policy will not result in a net-cost increase to the Department.

Acting according to the precepts of community policing which promotes neighborhood-based solutions for crime prevention and reduction, sector management was instituted citywide in January 1999. Ended on January 24, 2000, sector management was the practice of separating each police district into distinct geographic areas, or sectors, to be managed by a Lieutenant, who was held responsible for all enforcement in that sector. The debate continues as to the success of this initiative – communities felt the police were more responsive to their concerns

Sector Management  
has already been  
ended as a failed  
crime-reduction  
initiative.

whereas patrol officers felt that sector management muddled the command structure and alienated officers from each other within their own district. According to the survey, only 23.1% of officers responding believed sector management an effective policy for crime reduction.

Despite its ostensible purpose of improving police-community relations, in reality sector management was another example of reactive policing. Sector management was ended because the program failed to solve the problems of serious violent crime.

### *Investigative Operations*

Investigative  
emphasis has not  
been on clearing  
cases by arrest or  
warrant.

The trend towards increased specialization over the last several years has led to operational separation among investigative units and shifted crime-reduction strategies away from a Department-wide focus. The result has been a lack of coordination between centralized units and investigative units at the District levels. CIB detectives have not been routinely interviewing suspects arrested by District patrol officers, and there has been little follow-up to information gathered. Interviews with detectives individually or in focus groups revealed that emphasis has been placed on closing cases by any means rather than by arrest or by warrant.

This pressure is also felt department wide: 80.9% of survey respondents agree that most burglary and car theft crimes are not thoroughly investigated because of a lack of manpower and other resources. Similarly, 76.6% of survey respondents say that patrol officers and detectives do not routinely dust for fingerprints when they respond to burglary or car theft crimes.

The BPD does not track the rate of cases accepted by the State's Attorney's Office for prosecution nor does it track the conviction rate of those cases ultimately prosecuted. These rates are crucial for determining investigator competency and the thoroughness of all criminal investigations.

The once nationally renowned Homicide Unit has been eviscerated by the Rotation Policy which has now ended.

The past pride of CIB, and the Homicide Unit especially, noted for their high clearance rates and nationally recognized expertise, has disappeared leaving the investigative corps dispirited and demobilized. A confidential study of the Homicide Unit conducted by a former Homicide Lieutenant and published in the *Baltimore Sun* on March 17, 2000 detailed many internal problems leading to a reduction in effectiveness, including the now-defunct Rotation Policy and substandard equipment. In addition, the report chronicled the decaying relationship between homicide investigators and prosecutors in the State's Attorney's Office.

Officers recognize the importance of being a nationally recognized police department – 95.5% of survey respondents believe the BPD should focus on restoring the level of competence of the Homicide Unit to what it was in the past.

There has been a lack of coordination between centralized investigative units and the Districts.

Another factor leading to poor performance is that communication between downtown detectives and patrol officers has been minimal, typical of centralized police departments that focus on reactive policing: 81.4% of survey respondents agreed that there is not enough communication between officers on different shifts or in other assignments or units. Interviews with detectives revealed that there is no focus on general (i.e., departmental) goals beyond each unit's specific area of responsibility.

The effectiveness of investigative case clearances is masked by the lack of data on closures by arrest or warrant.

Based on information provided by the Criminal Investigation Bureau for the last four years, it is impossible to determine the effectiveness of detectives in clearing cases assigned to them. Although the information does reveal case closure rates by unit, interviews with CIB detectives revealed a lack of consistency across units in defining cases as cleared. Specifically, this data does not truly provide an accurate picture of case clearances by defining rates as either cleared by arrest, by issuance of a warrant or summons, or cleared by exception – the standard measure of investigative competency. UCR clearance rates as reported by the BPD to the FBI are also unreliable measures of effectiveness due to the level of underreporting of UCR crime revealed by the crime audit.

CIB does track the number of warrants it serves – both arrest and search and seizure – and the total number of arrests (including drug arrests), but does not detail how these categories are related to case closure or clearance rates.

Arrested suspects are not routinely debriefed.

In addition to concerns surrounding measuring the true performance of CIB, there are no standards for administrative follow-up and debriefing by detectives of suspects arrested by patrol officers. Only 28.6% of officers responding to the survey agreed that CIB detectives routinely interview prisoners arrested by patrol officers. Just as in the Districts, there is little strategic crime analysis performed, mapping of crime incidents, or regular discussion about crime trends. Nor is there relentless follow-up and assessment of criminal activities reported to CIB or responded to by CIB detectives.

To address these concerns, shootings are no longer investigated by the Homicide Unit and tasked investigative units in the Districts with this function. This will allow



Homicide detectives to focus solely on reducing the high murder rate in the City.

Furthermore, the Chief of the newly-structured Criminal Investigation Division has set a target date of March 22, 2000 for the decentralization of 65 detectives to the Districts. The new district-based investigative units will focus on major crimes, to include robberies, burglaries, aggravated assaults, and shootings, and domestic violence cases. Each unit will be managed by a Lieutenant who in turn will report to one of three CID Area Commanders. Staffing levels will be allocated according to proportion of criminal incidents occurring in each District accounting for existing District-based units as well. Additionally, staffing levels will be reviewed after the initial 90 days of operations, and annually thereafter.

### *Drug Enforcement*

Drug dealing/use is the engine driving crime in Baltimore.

In Baltimore, much like in other cities with major crime problems, drug dealing and drug use have been identified as a significant cause of crime by both officers and citizens alike. Both the Police and citizens alike recognize the scourge of drugs in Baltimore and have promised to rid the city of the ten largest open-air drug markets by June 2000. To this end, the BPD has implemented its “Open Air Drug Market Eradication Program” on February 1, 2000. As stated in the second paragraph of the plan,

“Open-air drug markets enhance the fear of crime and may increase the likelihood of victimization. They create fortified neighborhoods of residents who hide behind the safety of their doors finding themselves unable to appreciate or participate in the activities of their own community. As one drug group or gang vies with another for control of

valuable sales territory, incidents of gun violence increase and lives are lost.”

Designed to target non-residents of Baltimore who travel into the city to purchase drugs, the program has had initial success. On Valentine’s Day, the police reported arresting 240 suspects in reverse sting operations.<sup>6</sup> The program is scheduled to continue into Summer 2000.

This program marks the new beginning of a concerted effort to apprehend both dealers and users. Moreover, it is a response to citizens’ concerns about perceived police indifference to the drug problem in Baltimore. As seen in the table below, although there has been an increase in drug-related calls for service as a percentage of total calls for service, the percentage of those calls resulting in arrest has dramatically decreased. According to the survey, over half of officers responding, 50.4%, believe it futile to arrest drug dealers since they end up back on the street the next day.

The percentage of calls reporting drug dealing that have resulted in arrests has dramatically declined.

BPD DRUG ENFORCEMENT CALLS FOR SERVICE VS. ARRESTS				
	Narcotics <u>CFS</u>	% of Total <u>CFS</u>	Narcotics <u>Arrests</u>	Arrests as % <u>of CFS</u>
1995	125,717	11.1%	47,315	37.6%
1996	125,630	11.3%	31,638	25.2%
1997	131,951	12.3%	30,942	23.5%
1998	134,285	12.2%	33,104	24.7%
1999	128,850	12.4%	30,671	23.2%

Source: BPD

There has not been  
a coordinated  
narcotics policy  
between the Drug  
Enforcement  
Section and the  
Districts.

Narcotics detectives have not been debriefing suspects arrested by District narcotics units on a routine basis, and several CIB Drug Enforcement detectives have admitted to a severe lack of communication among units due to what has been perceived to be “turf battles” over cases.

The Drug Enforcement Section of CIB is charged with targeting mostly mid-level drug cases. However, there does not appear to be a coordinated narcotics policy – street-level drug dealing is left to narcotics units within each District and thus outside the Section’s control, and major upper-level cases have usually required federal participation to the exclusion of street-level officers. Also, effective narcotics interdiction has been hampered by the low number of detectives – 23 – assigned to the Drug Enforcement Section. Furthermore, there are less than 100 narcotics investigators department-wide including the 12 investigators detailed to the Safe Neighborhood Initiative.

Cities that have been successful in dramatically reducing their crime rates, such as New Orleans and New York, have strategically targeted drugs as the engine driving crime in their cities. New York has devoted almost 15% of its force to narcotics interdiction; to replicate New York’s success in Baltimore will require the addition of over 300 investigators.

### *Shift Schedule*

Almost all of the officers interviewed during this Assessment expressed dissatisfaction with the current six days on-two days off (6/2) work schedule. Many officers felt that the extended work week gave them little time to rest and relax before having to report to work for another six days. According to the survey, 82.2% of officers

responding believed that the demands of the 6/2 work schedule often caused police officers to work at levels below their full capability. Also according to the survey, when asked to list three things officers would change if they could, “change work/leave/court schedule” was the number three response. According to the 1998 Wage and Benefit Survey, Baltimore is one of only two cities out of 305 surveyed currently utilizing the 6/2 shift schedule.<sup>7</sup> Officers clearly agree that a change in the current shift schedule would be welcomed.

### *Force Composition and Recruitment*

The racial composition of the BPD is the opposite of the City's.

Although the BPD has made progress in bringing the representation of minorities on the force in line with their representation in the community, the BPD’s racial composition is opposite that of Baltimore.

BPD RACIAL/ETHNIC COMPOSITION			
	Baltimore <u>1990 Census</u>	BPD Total <u>2/15/00</u>	Ranking Officers <u>2/15/00</u>
Blacks	59.2%	38.1%	23.2%
Whites (non-Hispanic)	39.1%	59.2%	73.9%
Others	1.7%	2.7%	2.9%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, BPD

In addition, women comprise 15.4% of the BPD, which is slightly greater than the national average of 14% for municipal police departments.

BPD RACE AND GENDER COMPOSITION							
	<u>WM</u>	<u>WF</u>	<u>BM</u>	<u>BF</u>	<u>OM</u>	<u>OF</u>	<u>Total</u>
Commissioner			1				<b>1</b>
Deputy Commissioner	2						<b>2</b>
Colonel	2	1	3				<b>6</b>
Major/Director	14	3	9	1		1	<b>28</b>
Captain	3		1				<b>4</b>
Lieutenant	81	7	11	2	3	0	<b>104</b>
Sergeant	239	11	71	18	9	1	<b>349</b>
Officer/Agent	1301	122	743	289	58	9	<b>2522</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>1642</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>836</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3012</b>

Racial and Gender breakdowns are as of 2/15/00. The BPD has since lost 112 personnel.  
Source: BPD

Minorities and females have comprised 41.4% of the promotions given between 1/1/95 and 11/23/99.

BPD SWORN APPOINTMENTS/PROMOTIONS 1/1/95 through 11/23/99							
	<u>WM</u>	<u>WF</u>	<u>BM</u>	<u>BF</u>	<u>OM</u>	<u>OF</u>	<u>Total</u>
Colonel	3		3				<b>6</b>
Major/Director	15	2	9	1		1	<b>28</b>
Lieutenant	43	7	13	2	3	1	<b>69</b>
Sergeant	123	10	55	17	6		<b>211</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>314</b>

Source: BPD

In an effort to fill department vacancies and to bring the racial and gender composition of the force in line with the City's, the BPD has engaged in recruiting efforts to attract qualified candidates to apply to become BPD officers. The Personnel Unit had set a recruiting goal of 50% minorities for each academy class. In the past three years, 43% of all police recruits hired by the BPD have been minorities and/or females.

The number of officers hired over the last three years has not been enough to offset attrition.

The BPD has been averaging 45 recruits per academy class and four academy classes per year, hiring 407 new police officers in 9 classes since 1997. However, the number of officers hired over the last three years – 407 – has not been nearly enough to offset attrition during the same period – 615 officers. Also, according to those officers surveyed, the quality of recruits over the last five years has been poor: 68.8%, believe that poor screening of new recruits by the BPD in the last five years has produced a lower caliber of officers. Interviews with officers in the Personnel Unit revealed that in the past, the BPD has hired recruits who have admitted to past use of marijuana or cocaine. However, the exact number of such recruits cannot be quantified and there is no evidence to link past drug use to current officer misconduct. Nonetheless, the screening standards of the BPD, at least in this area, must be improved.

Interviews with members of the Personnel Department and Education and Training Division also revealed that the BPD is having difficulty attracting enough applicants to fill academy classes and that the academy is only operating at half capacity. One reason may be the low compensation given to BPD officers discussed further on in this chapter. Another reason has been the lack of compelling recruitment campaigns specifically targeting young men and women with strong credentials. The New Orleans Police

The BPD must be brought to authorized strength rapidly by accelerated recruiting and testing.

Department was able to increase the number of officers recruited by 16-fold with a carefully crafted and targeted advertising campaign.

To make inroads on high crime in Baltimore, the Department must be brought up to at least authorized strength through drastically accelerated recruiting and testing.

### *Technical Services*

The BPD currently does not have electronic surveillance capabilities. This is being remedied.

To improve the operating and investigative capabilities of the BPD, a target date of April 2000 has been set for forming a technical response unit to be modeled on cutting-edge response units in other large cities. This unit, consisting of ten detectives and technicians, will provide technical support by improving the electronic surveillance capabilities (i.e. electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping) of the BPD. Currently the BPD does not possess these capabilities. Furthermore, the information gathered by this unit will allow detectives to develop stronger cases against major suspects contributing to the high rates of violent crime in Baltimore.

### **Warrants**

There are over 54,000 outstanding warrants for known criminals.

The BPD's focus on responding to 911 calls has resulted in less attention to tracking down known criminals, *after they have been identified*. As of March 30, 2000, there were over 54,000 warrants active, with nearly 250 being warrants for murder or attempted murder. This backlog is in part due to past practices of officers relying solely on incomplete information contained in computer records listing any

outstanding warrants when they detain suspects or arrest them for other offenses.

BPD officers themselves recognize that warrants have not been served at a high rate: only 49.9% of survey respondents agreed with the statement that the BPD is effective at catching individuals wanted on warrants. Although there is a Warrant Squad, it consists of only 6 detectives to serve warrants: neither detectives in investigative units nor patrol officers have been held accountable to find those wanted on warrants. However, at the end of January 2000, the BPD allied with the Baltimore County Police Department to begin active searching of fugitives.

A Warrant  
Apprehension Task  
Force has been  
formed to  
apprehend the most  
violent fugitives.

A Warrant Apprehension Task Force has been formed, consisting of 30 detectives, to systematically seek and apprehend Baltimore's violent fugitives. In addition, cooperation with the Maryland Division of Correction, Department of Parole and Probation, and the Department of Juvenile Justice is being sought to improve access to all relevant data on those under court-ordered supervision including juveniles.

## **Crime Reports**

A criminal incident report is required for each reported crime incident and is to be submitted by the end of the officer's shift. Field supervisors review the reports to ensure that the report is complete and the classification of crime is correct. This classification receives a final review at Central Records which enters the classification into the Uniform Crime Reports (UCRs). The BPD sends its UCRs to the FBI via the State of Maryland on a monthly basis. However, past audits of criminal incident reports to verify



their accuracy and tardiness have been conducted only sporadically and not relentlessly, as have past efforts in the Department to cross check reports filed with calls dispatched to verify response times. More importantly, almost half of the officers surveyed, 47.5%, believe that crime reports are often altered after the fact to downgrade incidents.

Also, the quality of the reports vary greatly, according to records technicians, detectives, and supervisors who review them. Officers themselves recognize that there is room for improvement: 71.6% of officers responding to the survey stated that training in report writing was only fair, poor or not available.

An audit of 1999 crime reports has been completed to provide a benchmark for measuring future crime reduction.

To assess the accuracy, integrity, and consistency with calls for service data, an audit of all BPD crime reports for the first half of 1999 commenced on December 7, 1999 and was completed on February 28, 2000. At issue was whether the crime statistics reported by the BPD to the FBI are a true reflection of the level of crime in the City of Baltimore. The BPD must establish a reliable benchmark against which future crime reduction can be measured.

Specifically, the BPD audited all crime reports to ensure that coding of incidents reported to police are in line with the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting guidelines and regulations. The audit was ordered to ascertain two things: one, whether written criminal incident reports truly reflect what the complainant stated or believes to have occurred, and two, whether the written reports are being correctly coded when the reviewer compares the officer's written narrative of the incident to the final crime classification. The actual delineation of the process is appended to the back of this Plan.

Prior to beginning the audit, the auditors – 1 Lieutenant and 16 Sergeants under direction of the Major commanding the Central Records Unit – received eight hours of in-service training in UCR crime incident coding from the FBI. The auditors then reviewed 58,688 written reports from the first six months of 1999: 55,202 with a UCR Part II crime index classification,<sup>8</sup> and a random sample of 3,486 written reports with a UCR Part I crime index classification. The auditors then re-interviewed, via telephone, a random sample of 3,960 complainants to further assess the completeness of the narrative on the written report. Using the FBI's statistical sampling methods and with assistance of members of the FBI's Crime Analysis, Research and Development Unit, the number of reports incorrectly classified were projected for all of 1999.

The FBI-endorsed audit of BPD crime reports found that 1999 felony crime was actually 15% higher than had been reported.

The audit reclassified 1,848 reports from Part II categories to Part I categories. Applying the FBI's accepted and proven formulas to the results of the citizen contacts resulted in another 8,181 reports being underreported as Part II offenses. In addition, the audit discovered 152 reports incorrectly classified as Part I offenses and 305 over-reported incidents due to errors in the computerized reporting system for UCR purposes. In all, for 1999, UCR Part I crime – the FBI's nationally accepted measure of crime in Baltimore – was underreported by 9,548 incidents. This will result in a projected increase of 14.6% in 1999 reported UCR incidents.

RESULTS OF BPD UCR CRIME AUDIT				
	<u>Totals</u> <u>Pre-Audit</u>	<u>% Change</u> <u>1998-1999</u>	<u>Totals</u> <u>Post-Audit</u>	<u>% Change</u> <u>1998-1999</u>
Murder	311	-0.6%	311	-0.6%
Rape	370	-21.1%	377	-19.6%
Robbery	7,432	-3.3%	7,595	-1.2%
Aggravated Assault	7,138	-5.5%	10,452	+38.3%
<i>Violent Crime Totals</i>	<i>15,251</i>	<i>-4.8%</i>	<i>18,735</i>	<i>+16.9%</i>
Burglary	11,078	-15.9%	12,313	-6.6%
Larceny-Theft	32,168	-10.4%	36,749	+2.3%
Auto Theft	7,010	-4.7%	7,258	-1.4%
<i>Property Crime Totals</i>	<i>50,256</i>	<i>-11.0%</i>	<i>56,320</i>	<i>-0.3%</i>
<b><i>Overall Crime Totals</i></b>	<b><i>65,507</i></b>	<b><i>-9.6%</i></b>	<b><i>75,055</i></b>	<b><i>+3.5%</i></b>

Source: BPD

As a result of the 1999 findings, all crime reports received for January and February 2000 as well as those throughout the remainder of the year will be scrutinized in this manner.

Also as a result of initiating the audit, six training sessions – 2 per day over a three-day period – were conducted by the FBI to retrain 240 supervisors and officers in UCR crime incident coding. This training will be expanded to include all supervisors and officers as well as all Report Reviewers in Central Records.

## Integrity

About 70% of BPD officers responding to the internal survey believe that at least some of their colleagues were shaking down drug dealers.

The Internal Investigation Division is charged with investigating all incidents of alleged police corruption and officer misconduct brought to its attention by citizens and BPD officers. Opinions differ as to the level of police corruption within the BPD: when probed in focus groups, some citizens believed that some officers are involved in drug dealing or protecting the dealers in some way; most officers interviewed believed that while there were probably “a few” rogue officers, incidents of police corruption were rare. The survey supports the officers’ opinions – 48.7% of survey respondents believe that between 1% and 5% of officers are currently taking drugs and/or money from drug dealers, and 23.2% of survey respondents believe that at least 26% of officers or higher are doing so.

Complaints can be made to one of several offices, including the IID office itself, the Human Relations Commission Office, the Legal Aid Bureau, the Community Relations Commission, the State’s Attorney’s Office, and the newly created Civilian Review Board. In addition, witnesses to corruption or victims of police misconduct can call 311 for a supervisor to respond to the scene. All complaints are ultimately referred to IID for investigation and receive an Internal Investigation Number (IIN).

Most complaints are made either to IID itself or to the District where the officer in question is assigned. However, the complaint is recorded by the officer or detective receiving the complaint, not by the person making it. This may lead to differences in the tone or discrepancies in the complainant’s account of the incident.

Complaints are investigated by IID and all sustained charges are sent to the BPD’s Legal Affairs Division (LAD)

with recommendations for discipline. LAD reviews the case and, using the Discipline Matrix, determines the appropriate punishment. LAD then notifies the Command where the offending officer is assigned for the officer's acceptance or refusal of discipline. If the officer refuses to accept the suggested discipline, the officer can request a trial board consisting of fellow sworn officers of varying ranks.

Complaints against police officers averaged nearly 1,900 per year from 1995-1998. However the total number of complaints in 1999 are expected to double as the BPD has classified all Failure to Appear in Court violations as Neglect of Duty complaints.

BPD INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION COMPLAINTS AGAINST OFFICERS					
<u>Allegation</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999*</u>
Neglect of Duty	202	188	371	476	1,226
Misconduct	306	358	318	509	211
Misconduct/VCS <sup>^</sup>	314	333	237	238	105
Supervisor Complaint	74	156	163	191	45
Excessive Force	469	455	383	397	155
Discourtesy	133	154	125	116	33
Attempt Suicide	279	170	158	179	91
Police Information	26	9	1	1	0
Unwarranted Action	29	20	32	23	1
Total Allegations	1,832	1,843	1,788	2,130	1,867

<sup>^</sup>Misconduct/VCS are Violations of Criminal Statutes; the other Misconduct category is for violations of department policy.

\*1999 totals are for the first six months only.

Source: BPD

In the past five years, 30% of complaints against police officers investigated have been sustained.

These numbers are misleading however, as IID has identified over 700 cases from 1999 not yet entered into the computer system for tracking cases. As such, the above numbers underrepresent the true workload of IID.

For all years under study, 30.0% of all cases investigated resulted in the charges being sustained (not including investigations still pending).

BPD INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION INVESTIGATION CLEARANCES					
	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999*</u>
Exonerated	19	20	17	4	0
Not Sustained	382	210	144	94	12
Unfounded	49	40	45	8	0
Sustained	211	151	82	2	2
Pending/Trial Board	111	167	338	726	948
Cases per Investigator	52.6	46.6	35.5	49.5	69.8

\*1999 totals are for the first six months only.  
Source: BPD

The ratio of internal cases to IAU investigator is very high by police department standards.

The ratio of cases to investigators is extremely high by police department standards. Interviews with IID investigators indicated that the average length of an investigation is one year, with investigations of serious cases taking even longer. As seen above, over 60% of cases investigated since 1995 have yet to be cleared.

Furthermore, no standards of investigative procedures exist for IID detectives. Detectives have lacked close

supervision and there has not been strict monitoring of cases being investigated by IID. In some instances, according to IID detectives interviewed, simultaneous investigations of a single case have been conducted. Fundamental background checks on the accused or complainant have rarely, if ever, been conducted. IID also lacks any capability to track numerous complaints against single officers, nor has there been any computer tracking of complaints by type – use of force, theft, shootings, assaults on police officers, resisting arrest, etc. Similarly, there has not been any mapping of complaints nor analysis of patterns to determine trends or to identify rogue officers.

The high number of unresolved internal cases causes deep discord among BPD officers.

The extraordinary number of unresolved cases are a major source of discord and frustration among officers who are the subjects of these investigations. Many officers interviewed individually or in focus groups remarked that they had open IID investigations pending against them – for one officer, the investigation had been open for over three years. Open IID investigations, among other things, prevent officers from transferring from the BPD to other departments. Several officers interviewed believed that this was one way of keeping officers in the BPD; officers who would have left for higher salaries in other jurisdictions feel they have been forced to remain.

IID Investigators counter that they are bound to investigate all complaints, regardless of their nature. Contributing to the delays, investigators say, is finding and interviewing all witnesses to most allegations, especially those of a serious nature. Most complainants, investigators say, are reluctant to follow through beyond the initial complaint for fear of police retribution.

Further contributing to this delay is the overwhelming number of complaints pending a trial board as requested by

officers. A recent audit of open IID cases in Legal Affairs by LAD personnel based on cases in LAD's files as of January 27, 2000, revealed 287 cases awaiting a trial board. Many of these cases have been open for at least one year. Of these cases, 194, or over two-thirds were cases dealing with minor violations – class A, B, or C violations of the Matrix. Adding to this backlog is the fact that Legal Affairs is currently receiving nearly 100 new cases per month, many of which continue to be of these minor categories. Aggressive follow-up by LAD personnel since February 2000 has resulted in the closing of over one-third of these cases to date.

Interviews with Legal Affairs personnel further revealed that almost all cases forwarded to LAD result in officers' requesting a trial board and then using all legal means to postpone them. Interviews also revealed that Legal Affairs attorneys have not been relentless in pursuing cases, choosing to postpone cases rather than trying them. As a result of these postponements, many trial boards are currently being scheduled for the first time. A new policy of no postponements by Legal Affairs attorneys for any new cases will serve to prevent adding to the current backlog.

Over half of the complaints against officers come from within the BPD.

IID statistics indicate that over half of the complaints made to IID come from BPD officers themselves, however this statistic is misleading. Interviews with IID investigators reveal that officer-initiated complaints are extremely rare. The overwhelming majority of these complaints come from the Command Staff and involve neglect of duty claims, specifically Failure to Appear in Court claims.

Overall, officers hold negative opinions of IID in general. Most officers do not feel IID is effective: 60.9% of survey respondents believe IID to be ineffective at investigating



complaints of officer misconduct. Officers believe that one way of improving efficiency would be for IID to prosecute citizens who make false complaints against BPD officers – 97.3% of survey respondents hold this opinion. Officers also want more training in how to interact with citizens to reduce complaints: 68.6% of survey respondents believe that the training they currently receive does not help to reduce citizen complaints. For most officers, 87.6% of survey respondents, the threat of a civilian complaint alone is enough to prevent them from being proactive.

## **Discipline**

The Disciplinary Matrix has been widely criticized for not achieving its promise of fair discipline applied equally to all officers.

In the last few years, questions have been raised regarding the BPD's disciplinary proceedings. These questions were raised in regard to a disparity between termination rates of black officers versus that of white officers. In an effort to eliminate this disparity, the Commissioner at that time formed an Advisory Council on Discrimination to standardize recommendations for disciplinary action. The result was the publication of the Disciplinary Matrix and the creation of the Professional Standards Unit. This Unit reviews all disciplinary cases and ensures that all punishments are consistent with the matrix system and applied equally to all officers. A Complaint Evaluation Board was also created to specifically review complaints of Excessive Force and Discourtesy made to IID.

Other measures taken to address the historical patterns of racial disparity within the BPD have been the creation of the EEOC Division within the BPD. This unit investigates complaints of employment discrimination. Also, annual cultural diversity training has been instituted and is mandatory for all sworn and civilian members of the BPD.

The new procedures for review of disciplinary proceedings have led to several interesting observations of those involved in the process. One, the overall termination rates have significantly decreased as all violations and resulting discipline have been codified by the Matrix. Two, while black officers are still being terminated at a higher rate than are white officers, it has been suggested that black and white officers are now being terminated for the same violations. However, that the termination rates for black officers still outpace that of white officers suggests continued improvement is necessary.

Most officers fear being unfairly disciplined, and consequently, are less proactive in doing their jobs.

According to the survey, 80.3% of officers responding to the survey believe that discipline of BPD members is unfair and not uniform. 85.5% of respondents believe that in the eyes of the department, officers are guilty until proven innocent. Similarly, 94.3% of respondents believe that in the eyes of the public, officers are guilty until proven innocent. This Catch-22 has led to other officer fears as well: 91.1% of survey respondents fear being unfairly disciplined, and as a result, are not proactive in their jobs.


Officers also expressed little faith in the Matrix: 62.7% of respondents believe that the Matrix does not ensure fair and uniform disciplinary treatment. Also, officers feel that when applied, the Matrix is applied differently to different officers: 41.5% of respondents believe the Matrix is only applied to patrol officers and not detectives; 44.1% of minority officers responding to the survey believe the Matrix is unfair to minority officers; and 37.8% of white officers responding to the survey believe the Matrix is unfair to white officers. Many officers interviewed in focus groups said also that while the matrix does standardize the punishment for types of offenses, the faction the officer

belongs to will determine for what type of offense he or she will be charged with.

## Operating Budget and Compensation


### *Overtime*

Because of the personnel shortage, especially in patrol and investigative operations, the Department has almost doubled the amount appropriated for general overtime in the last year. However, since 1991, the amount appropriated has never been enough to cover actual expenditures. Overtime has been funded by reallocating moneys not being used as a result of officer vacancies.



Source: BPD

In addition, court overtime expenditures in the last year have nearly doubled the amount appropriated for that purpose.



Source: BPD

Court overtime is projected to rise to \$5.9 million even though only \$3.2 million is expected to be appropriated. For 1999 alone, the amount of overtime expended represented nearly \$5,200 earned by each officer in the Department.

The BPD does not make distinctions in other types of overtime costs, e.g. case, special event, proactive, 911. As such, how overtime is being employed and its effects on the crime fighting capability of the BPD cannot be determined.

Hiring to 3,274 officers however, will not eliminate the need for overtime: regardless of staffing level, proactive

overtime must be strategically and relentlessly employed to target criminals and high crime areas.

### *Compensation*

Many officers said they contemplate transfers to other police departments because of low BPD pay.

According to many officers, the low-entry pay has handicapped the ability of the BPD to recruit and retain qualified individuals to become Baltimore Police Officers. Many officers interviewed in focus groups admitted that they have entertained thoughts of leaving the BPD for surrounding jurisdictions, and most could name one or two officers they personally knew had done so. Based on the high number of officers that have left the BPD in the last five years, many officers had the perception that because of low pay, the BPD has been responsible for providing training and basic job experience for most of the surrounding municipal law enforcement agencies.

In starting salary, the BPD ranks 13th among 17 surrounding jurisdictions surveyed.

In the 1999 Comparative Salary and Benefits Survey conducted by the Maryland State Police, the Baltimore Police Department starting salary of \$28,404 ranked the BPD 13<sup>th</sup> out of 17 surrounding jurisdictions surveyed.<sup>9</sup> The BPD ranked below the nearest immediate jurisdiction – Baltimore County Police Department – for all ranks. In the 1998 Police Wage and Benefit Survey of 305 cities with populations of at least 50,000, the BPD's top-step salary for police officers ranked 262<sup>nd</sup> on the list.<sup>10</sup> If the BPD is expected to reduce high turnover *and* attract more qualified police candidates, as well as boost morale, significant pay raises must be sought for all BPD officers.

### *Secondary Employment*

Because of low salaries, many officers have been supplementing their income through secondary employment, much of which is centralized within the Overtime Unit in the BPD. Currently through this mechanism, the BPD provides police services to clients above that of normal duty responsibilities.

92% of officers surveyed said secondary employment was necessary to meet personal expenses.

On average, the Unit schedules 28,000 to 30,000 positions annually. Times typically average eight hours, but vary from four hours to as many as nineteen. In 1999, the unit scheduled over 260,000 labor hours yielding approximately \$7.6 million in overtime for police officers and \$230,000 in administrative costs for the BPD.

Currently, BPD officers are not allowed to work secondary employment more than 32 cumulative hours in one seven-day period. Also, officers are prohibited from working secondary employment at any alcohol-beverage outlet such as bars nor are officers allowed to work secondary employment where gaming devices are in operation.

The BPD allows personnel to work secondary employment on a private basis and not related in any way to the Overtime Unit. But because there are no mechanisms for control of these types of arrangements, no analysis could be conducted to determine the extent to which officers avail themselves of this opportunity or are in compliance with Department guidelines.

Officers themselves recognize the importance of secondary employment. According to the survey, 91.8% of respondents agreed that secondary employment is necessary to meet personal expenses.

## Rewards

Most BPD officers think that Department recognition and awards are political.

There was a focus group perception by officers that Department awards are political. Furthermore, other officers said, the awards and commendations have nothing to do with duty assignments or promotions, making their achievement nothing more than symbolic. 81.6% of officers responding to the survey disagreed with the statement “BPD officers who do outstanding work usually receive department commendations.”

## Technology

BPD technology in some areas is state of the art; in other areas, it is lacking all together.

The BPD currently has a combination of state of the art technology on some levels and a complete lack of applications and hardware at others. Most of the newer systems are available for use by those at police headquarters. Only the major departmental systems have been updated, however – headquarters-based investigative units have little or no technology available to them.

One of the major strengths of the BPD is the cooperation between Management Information Systems (MIS) and field/investigative units. As opposed to other departments studied, MIS is forward-looking, proactive, and shares information willingly. Many of the computers and systems in place throughout the department have recently been acquired – within the last 2-3 years – as a result of the leadership within MIS. This openness, combined with the ongoing acquisition of new computers and systems, places the BPD in a relatively strong position to successfully use technology to reduce crime. However, it appears that the BPD suffers more from a lack of direction than from a lack of information.

The BPD recently began converting five years of data to a new Records Management System (RMS) in January 2000. This system will ultimately replace most of the individual and local databases currently in use throughout the department.

### *Hardware*

In order to do mapping and be able to run the anticipated RMS system, new computers are being delivered and installed. Most of the computers in use throughout the BPD – headquarters and districts – are Pentium® class machines or better and are capable of running the new systems. The older machines scattered throughout the department are scheduled for replacement. To date, 380 new computers have been installed or are in the process of being delivered with a goal of 500 new machines department-wide.

The investigative  
units appear to be  
the least  
technologically  
equipped.

The CID investigative units in headquarters are perhaps the least technologically equipped in the department. The Burglary and Robbery Units as well as the Property Division all need new systems installed. The computers being used by the Intelligence Unit for gang identification are too slow to effectively display photos, and the Fugitive Squad charged with serving open warrants has a noticeable lack of modern computers. Although slated to receive new computers as part of the RMS installation, these units should receive priority as they currently do not have sufficient hardware to properly analyze their data.

Nearly every office, unit and district has at least one connection to the BPD network. The current system functions well for email transfers and other file-based applications, however, as the distribution of more graphics-



intensive information increases, the current LAN connections will be too slow to handle the increased traffic. MIS is in the process of upgrading the network to remedy this problem.

### *Communications/CAD*

The Baltimore Police Department is the primary safety answering point (PSAP) for the City, sharing resources with the BPD, BFD, EMS and Public Works. The CAD system is brand new, having been activated on November 2, 1999. To handle the volume of calls, the BPD uses a split-call system, encouraging the public to dial 311 for non-emergencies instead of 911. This has helped to reduce the volume of calls to 911 operators, resulting in a reduction in answer time from six seconds to two seconds. Of the approximately 1.7 million calls for service received last year, roughly two-thirds (1.1 million) were received by 911 with the remaining third being directed to 311.

Callers to 311 receive the same services as 911 calls. If the incident being reported is of a serious nature, the call is immediately transferred to 911 for dispatch. Because of legal requirements, 311 calls may not be identified prior to activating the telephone switch for the BPD. Any delays in answering result in hang-ups which are untraceable or not counted if the caller disconnects before entering the 311 system, and may possibly yield a false assessment of the system's effectiveness. Without any other indication of public dissatisfaction with 311 answer times, the true effectiveness of the 311 system cannot be determined.

### *Radios*

In conjunction with the CAD system, the BPD has converted to a new Motorola 800 Mhz, trunked radio system. The radios allow for digital encryption of transmission, rendering eavesdropping highly unlikely. The 800 Mhz system also provides a greater bandwidth for information transmissions capable of handling the increased amount of data that will occur with the installation of the new laptop or MDT-520 system (Mobile Data Terminals for police cars).

### *Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs)/Laptops*

Most officers surveyed report that computers in patrol cars do not work properly. As a result, they are seldom used.

Although there are MDTs installed in most patrol cars, they are old and cumbersome. As a general, unstated rule, officers do not use the MDTs, in most cases, never turning them on. In most instances, the MDTs do not function properly: 67.2% of officers responding to the survey stated that the computers in the patrol cars do not work properly.

MDTs and laptops in cars improve calls for service response and allow background checks to be made by patrol officers from their patrol cars. These units give police instantly accessible information, eliminating the need to channel requests through dispatchers or desk officers. This information includes the possibility of almost immediate access to mugshot photos, license plate information, and status of outstanding warrants. MDTs and laptops also allow field report writing as well as tracking of units by supervisors.

At the writing of this Plan, the BPD has examined the possibility of upgrading to newer Motorola Model 520 MDTs. These new terminals are functional Pentium® class

computers mounted in the patrol vehicles allowing the use of Windows-based applications. This possible upgrade will give patrol officers the capability to view maps, photographs of wanted suspects and other geographical information in the patrol car. Additionally, the new MDTs will provide a platform on which the BPD will build its On-Line Complaint System. When developed, incident reports will be entered into the RMS directly from the vehicle.

Currently, 50 of the new MDTs have been installed, with another 80 scheduled for delivery. 200 MDTs have been funded via a federal grant but their installation is on hold pending further analysis of the utility of the Motorola MDTs compared to laptop computers for the vehicles. Once a selection has been made, the MDTs or the laptops will be installed in every marked patrol car, all supervisors' and District Commanders' vehicles and into selected detective squad cars.

A functional and user-friendly MDT or laptop computer system is imperative to facilitate implementation of crime controls. Officers must use the terminals as a tool in investigating crime and identifying suspects. The largest obstacle in the current MDT program is training: use of the older terminals was limited because training was either non-existent or limited. The Police Academy must expand its curriculum to include instruction and training in the use of such devices.

### *Mapping*

The BPD currently uses computer mapping to map crime data and other information. The department is scheduled to change mapping programs to accommodate the

RCAGIS system (Regional Crime Analysis Geographic Information System), an information-sharing system which is scheduled to be online in late 2000.

Many units do not have mapping software which handicaps monitoring crime patterns and trends.

The current distribution of mapping software is insufficient for the needs of the BPD: numerous units are without any mapping software whatsoever, including critical units such as the Robbery and Burglary Units. Without localized mapping capabilities, these units are finding it extremely difficult to establish patterns or trends. Currently, these units are forced to contact Research and Planning (R&P) to generate maps for them. This precludes interactive mapping and does not allow for the application of hypothetical scenarios. In many cases, the units must settle for the pre-packaged maps that are distributed weekly by R&P.

R&P produces a wide array of maps every week that are distributed throughout the department prior to the CrimeStac meeting. Units who receive the maps have expressed their dissatisfaction with their utility in addressing real-time situations. The BPD maps all of the major crimes and produces various density and sector maps, however because the maps are generated on paper and not available on computer, officers have found it difficult to identify trends or patterns. Several examples of the types of maps currently produced by the BPD follow.











The ability of the user to quickly add or remove layers of crimes to establish relationships between crime locations and other local data (bars, banks, warrants, shootings, etc.) is the strength of electronic mapping. By using electronic mapping, users also have access to the specific details of each crime so that they can make informed decisions as to force deployment and causality. Further input is received from the users themselves – each user applies individual understanding of local conditions to the information on the maps. The end result is a more insightful analysis and interpretation of the data. While the maps produced by R&P are useful, their effectiveness is severely limited.

The new COMSTAT/Crime Analysis Unit, which reports directly to the Deputy Commissioner for Administration, is currently charged with analyzing maps to ascertain trends or patterns, especially on a citywide basis. The initial information is entered based on the preliminary incident report by the reviewers, and maps are later prepared. The Crime Analysis Unit has begun analyzing the maps to identify crime clusters, patterns, and trends. Eventually, the BPD will make interactive mapping available to all Districts and investigative units.

In addition to crime incidents, warrant and parolee information needs to be electronically mapped.

In addition to mapping crime types, warrant and parolee information must be electronically mapped. Currently, this information is distributed on paper printouts, and the volume of the records is so great as to render input into a database very time-consuming. In addition to the value of overlaying warrant and parolee information on crime locations, mapping warrants will allow the Warrant Squad to serve warrants quickly and easily, based on their location. Not only will this save a tremendous amount of time, mapping will allow open warrants to be used as a strategic tool to impact target areas or buildings.

The RMS system is slated to include basic mapping capabilities so users will be able to easily generate maps. Although the system will only offer a limited amount of data that can be viewed on the map, it will prove to be a valuable addition by allowing officers to generate and view maps that otherwise may not be produced. Phase II of the RMS installation program will include more advanced mapping features to satisfy the needs of more proficient users.

While most of the above critique of the mapping process is critical, there are positives as well. Historically geo-coded crime information is maintained and distributed on CD-ROM to the districts. This is a very valuable tool in tracking the movements and displacement of crime over time. This program should be expanded and officers trained in its uses to formulate seasonal strategies. Additionally, those persons who utilize the mapping software are knowledgeable in its use and produce a high-quality product.

## **Training**

Training has been inadequate according to most officers surveyed.

Training, both recruit and in-service, has been inadequate, according to most officers interviewed. Over the last few years, changes in the curriculum and instruction have been made in the Education and Training Division to redress some of these issues.

The training academy now offers 831 hours of recruit training covering 508 training objectives. The staff of instructors has been increased to 46, 35 full-time with outside instructors filling the remaining positions. Also, recruits now receive 45 college credits in the City of

Baltimore Community College system as an incentive for officers to continue their education after the academy.

Officers complain about quality of instruction crediting this with lack of attractive incentives to secure skilled trainers.

Some officers interviewed in focus groups were critical of the Field Training Officer program. They complained about the quality of the instruction, crediting the low quality to the lack of attractive incentives to secure skilled trainers. Currently, field training officers (FTOs) receive an extra \$12 per day for every day they have a trainee; many officers thought this was inadequate. For these officers, poor instruction has depreciated the value of the academy training and has handicapped new members of the Department. The lack of what the officers thought proper financial incentive, they felt, reflected a lack of concern by the command staff for the importance of training.

78% of officers surveyed said they received less than five days of in-service training in 1999.

That officers think available training is poor may explain why so few avail themselves of the training offered. The Department offers 36 hours of mandatory in-service training but many members of the department admitted to receiving less than that. According to the department survey, 78.5% of respondents stated that they received less than five days of in-service training last year. Most of the in-service training offered is for recertification of weapons (firearms, batons, OC spray) and practical based training (i.e. driving, basic investigation techniques, and stop and frisk techniques).

As revealed by the chart below, among officers polled, 70% or more said that training in 19 of 28 areas of policing was either not available, or only poor to fair.

BPD OFFICERS RATING TRAINING		
<u>Training Subject</u>	<u>Poor or Not Available</u>	<u>Fair, Poor, or Not Available</u>
Computers	68.3%	94.4%
Pre-promotional training	66.1%	88.8%
First aid/CPR	57.1%	84.5%
Supervision/management	43.3%	84.4%
Courtroom testimony	51.9%	83.9%
Conflict resolution	42.7%	83.7%
Latent prints	46.2%	82.4%
Stress management	44.1%	79.1%
Interpersonal communications	35.2%	76.8%
Avoiding infectious diseases	35.3%	76.4%
Criminal law updates	34.3%	76.0%
Investigations	35.1%	75.9%
Crime prevention	33.1%	75.9%
Searches and seizures	38.3%	75.4%
Policies and procedures	26.8%	72.2%
Evidence handling	27.2%	71.9%
Report writing	31.2%	71.6%
Evidence collection	30.5%	70.8%
Problem solving	30.1%	70.4%
Stop and frisk	24.0%	69.7%
Corruption/integrity	31.1%	68.2%
Baton use/crowd control	26.8%	62.9%
Hate and bias crimes	20.8%	62.7%
Officer safety	21.3%	59.2%
Use of force	16.0%	53.8%
Cultural diversity	16.5%	53.3%
Domestic violence	9.2%	45.0%
Firearms training	5.7%	26.4%

Source: BPD Survey

Half the officers surveyed said that use of force training is no better than fair.

The rate of officer-involved shootings is over 4 times that of other cities that have adopted assertive policing strategies.

Based on the above table, over half of the officers responding (53.3%) believe that use of force training is either fair to poor, or not available. An important aspect indicating the need for improved training in this area is the high number of officer-involved shootings in Baltimore. In 1999, BPD officers shot 32 individuals. This translates into a rate of over 4.8 citizens per 100,000 population, a rate of over four times that of other cities that have adopted assertive policing strategies.

OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTINGS, 1993-1999 (RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION)			
	1999	1998 Population	Rate
Baltimore	32	662,537	4.8
New York City	71	7,357,745	1.0
New Orleans	8	471,157	1.7

Source: BPD, NYPD, NOPD  
Population totals from the FBI's *Crime in the United States, 1998*.

## Equipment and Facilities

### *Equipment*

There were many complaints among officers about the equipment. Most centered on the unavailability of equipment and the age of the equipment that officers were provided.

Police officers were most critical of the patrol cars. Patrol officers were quick to point out what they believed to be a

lack of availability of patrol cars; detectives viewed the unmarked fleet as antiquated. Patrol cars have averaged nearly 100,000 miles per year and most detective units do not have enough cars for all members of the units. As of October 5, 1999, the BPD had 533 marked vehicles and 388 unmarked and covert vehicles. Most officers interviewed believed that this was insufficient.

Better management  
of the vehicle fleet  
is needed to  
improve availability.

However, interviews with ranking officers and command staff believed that an increase in the number of vehicles was not necessary. Rather, they believed that it was a problem of vehicle management. Specifically, ranking officers pointed to an increasing number of marked vehicles that remain at the Districts rather than being used on Patrol because the vehicles have been assigned to specific units or shifts, and the cars are not being used for regular patrol shifts. That certain officers “protect” their cars from regular usage has led to the perception of unequal treatment of officers. Similarly, the trend towards Department over-specialization has led to new units requiring cars that are taken from existing units. This has fed the perception that, in the minds of some patrol officers at least, the Patrol Bureau operates at the expense of other units.

Another complaint involving the vehicle fleet centered on the issue of maintenance and repair. The BPD does not own its vehicles rather they are leased from the City of Baltimore at a set rate per mile (\$0.71 cents per mile for marked vehicles). As a result, all maintenance and repairs are conducted at one of six City-owned facilities located throughout Baltimore. Some officers contend that because these facilities must service all city vehicles, basic maintenance and repairs take a long time, leaving officers without cars for their patrol posts. Currently, the BPD’s

Motor Pool has no spare vehicles for replacing out-of-service vehicles.

Interviews with City personnel responsible for fleet maintenance paint a different picture. They point to the City's policy of rotating older cars with newer cars – 1994 models are replaced at 90,000 miles, 1995 models at 100,000 miles, and 1996 models at 110,000 miles – and also to the policy of rotating high-mileage vehicles to less demanding posts. DPW officials also point to the high frequency with which officers unnecessarily damage their vehicles, either through negligence (accidents) or indifference (transmission or other mechanical problems).

Interestingly, both officers and City personnel agree that the BPD must exert stricter accountability for the use or misuse of its vehicles.

Two other specific equipment issues deserve reference here. In focus groups, some officers noted that the bulletproof vests they are issued have expired, and that the Department is not quick to replace them. More revealing however, was the low number of officers who claim to wear vests, expired or not.

The other issue involves the Koga stick, which replaced the espantoon baton several years ago. Several officers in focus groups remarked that the Koga sticks are unwieldy and have increased suspects' fear of police brutality because of the stick's increased size. The Koga stick is being replaced with the ASP, an extendable baton, much to the approval of many officers: 84.2% of the officers responding to the survey believe the espantoon or ASP to be a better baton than the Koga stick.

Although there are a few complaints about essential equipment items, this is not the case with small item supplies. The survey supports this finding.

BPD OFFICERS RATING EQUIPMENT	
<u>Item</u>	<u>Often/Somewhat Available</u>
Working and effective radios	86.9%
Defensive spray	81.4%
Crime scene tape	55.7%
Office supplies	50.9%
Latex gloves	50.5%
Access to computers in offices	48.8%
Reliable police cars	47.1%
Polaroid cameras/film	40.6%
Flares	37.6%
Mouth shields for CPR	28.2%
Fingerprint kits in police cars	25.5%
Fire extinguishers	25.3%

### *Facilities*

Currently, the BPD Headquarters building is undergoing renovation (and has been since 1995) to improve the working conditions and increase workspace. However, as of the writing of this Plan, only two out of ten floors are



complete with a target date of 2001 to fully complete the renovations.

As a result of the on-going renovations, the building has become an inefficient working environment; many of the staff are required to work in offices designed to accommodate fewer people than they do now. The building lacks proper ventilation and some offices do not have windows. Furthermore, no security exists to prevent unauthorized access to any BPD offices and areas. All people in the building are required to wear an identification card if not in BPD uniform, but rarely, if ever, are checks conducted on those individuals not in possession of such a card.

Detectives remarked of the lack of detention facilities for suspects as well as sufficient interview rooms for witnesses. Indeed, one detective interviewed recounted a story of how a suspect escaped detention through the ceiling of the unit's office.

The survey reveals that many officers hold negative attitudes regarding the conditions of the station houses where they work.

BPD OFFICERS RATING FACILITIES	
	<u>Less Than Adequate</u>
Lock boxes for gun storage	70.0%
Detention rooms for suspects	63.8%
Number of interview rooms	60.5%
Copying/reproduction services	53.3%
Office size and space	49.1%
Air conditioning	46.3%
Computer hardware and software	42.2%
Overall cleanliness	34.3%
Walls and ceilings of buildings	34.1%
Water leak prevention	32.7%
Plumbing and restroom facilities	28.7%
Heating	28.6%
Secretarial/administrative support	26.8%

## **Communications**

### *Public Information*

The BPD does have guidelines in place regarding what types of information can be released and the Public Affairs Unit of the Department is the principle point of contact for comment. The PAU itself has developed a program to disseminate to the public news of Department accomplishments and positions. However, most of these public announcements and promotions had focused on

Many officers interviewed do not think the BPD has been effective publicly at promoting officers' achievements or defending officers' actions.

creating a “public-friendly” image, promoting programs that had little, if anything, to do with crime reduction. Many officers interviewed believed that neither the unit nor the Department as a whole had been proactive in promoting officers’ achievements and defending officers’ actions. One officer summed up this feeling by saying that the Department was “quick to abandon [its officers] at the first sign of trouble.” This has fueled the perception of many officers that the Department does not support them.

Several survey findings point to the strained relationship between the BPD and the public and media. 78.6% of survey respondents believe that the relationship between the police and people of Baltimore is not very good, and 92.1% believe that media coverage of the BPD does not help BPD officers to do their job. Furthermore, 94.3% of officers responding to the survey agreed that in the eyes of the public, police officers are guilty until proven innocent.

### *Media Audit*

To further assess the BPD’s relationship with the media, all newspaper reports and a sample of video reports since 1998 were collected and reviewed for content and stance towards the BPD. According to the BPD’s Public Affairs Unit, “positive” stories increased by 11% in 1999, and “positive” stories outweighed “negative” stories by nearly 2-1. These findings do not fully explain the perceptions of officers detailed above rather these findings would suggest the opposite.

Further review of these compilations revealed a somewhat different conclusion than that of the PAU. Review and reclassification revealed that successive negative stories dealing with the same issue were not collected. Included in

Negative news stories about the BPD have made it more difficult, officers say, to do their jobs.

these stories are the continuous repetition of the yearly murder count, the number of daily shootings, the ever-present drug dealing, etc. These stories serve to instill in the public the inability of the BPD to combat these problems. Also, many stories which simply reported police activities, i.e. stories reporting police arrests, were originally classified as “positive.” These stories, although numerous in count, do not truly enhance the image of the Department as the public expects these activities. More often than not, negative stories detailing low numbers of arrests give the impression that the BPD was ineffective and not doing its job.

Likewise, there were few “positive” articles relating police activity to reductions in crime. Indeed several articles detailing the reductions in crime over the past two years could arguably be classified as “negative” as these articles also criticized the BPD for “not doing enough.”

Perhaps the most damaging articles to the BPD’s image were those detailing Department rifts and conflicts, both internal and with external organizations. In interviews with officers, many believed that other officers were quick to go to the press in an effort to try to discredit others within the Department, or to lend credence to their own concerns. Still others believed that the media looks to create controversies where none exist. In both instances, the Department’s image as a professional and effective crime-fighting organization suffers.

### *Internal Communications*

Officers say that authoritative information on procedures, expectations, issues, and developments is sporadic at best. As a result, rumor is rife, speculation abounds, and

Authoritative information within the BPD on procedures, expectations, and issues is sporadic at best, officers say.

misinformation is accepted as fact. This lack of communication has prolonged the cynicism and skepticism that still characterize the BPD culture, a legacy from past police administrations.

Although Department procedures exist for the distribution of policies and information, some officers interviewed stated that only rarely is information passed from supervisors to officers; supervisors countered this by saying that officers barely acknowledge the receipt of information and do not act on it. Said one supervisor, “it [the information] gets inside their head, but it doesn’t stay there very long.” According to the survey, more officers get most of their information about department news, including policies, procedures, and programs from “peers” or “rumors” (29.3% and 19.5% of respondents respectively) than from “written orders/Department directives” (13.6%).

### *Policies and Procedures*

Most survey respondents said that BPD orders are not clearly written or fairly applied.

Interviews with members of the Planning and Research Section revealed that officers are supposed to know the Department’s General Orders upon graduation from the Academy and are supposed to receive a personal copy. Officers are also supposed to receive updates to these Orders, either via roll call distribution, or on a unit by unit basis. But in some areas, the General Orders have not been revised in many years, and in most instances rarely are. In the past, new orders have been promulgated without checking to see if they will contradict other existing orders. According to the survey, 69.1% of respondents agreed Department policies and procedures are not clearly written and are unfairly administered.

These situations have weakened officers' ability to be proactive. In focus groups, several officers recounted instances when they were confronted with conflicting orders, and ordered by different supervisors to do the opposite because "that's what's in the Orders." In the words of one officer, when that happens, "you're damned if you do, and damned if you don't. The best thing then is never to get into that situation."

## **THE CULTURAL DIAGNOSTIC**

The Cultural Diagnostic is a research system which employs qualitative and quantitative measures to define the characteristics of the organizational culture which the leader must act within, and to some extent, against to achieve his or her strategic vision. To this end, the analysis that follows defines cultural assets, cultural obstacles to change, the operating culture, the core culture, and the value or values that must guide revision of key organizational systems to institutionalize a new high-performance culture.

The Baltimore Police Department's culture has been scrutinized by interviewing individually or in focus groups more than 250 members of the Department, interviewing in focus groups over 120 citizens of the City, and analyzing the responses to a confidential questionnaire completed by 2,447 of 3,012 officers, a response rate of 81%. The focus groups were conducted during a four-week period in November and December 1999, and the survey was distributed and returned during a two-week period in January 2000. Cultural assets and obstacles were uncovered in both interviews and in focus groups, as well as through officer responses to specific survey questions.

### **Cultural Assets of the BPD**

The Baltimore Police Department has several strong cultural assets:

#### *Professionalism*

The BPD has a strong corps of individuals who are determined to function as effective law enforcement

officers. They are dedicated to public service in their determination to reduce crime and protect the citizens of Baltimore.

#### *Bravery*

This is an assumed quality in many members of the organization given the dangers inherent in policing.

#### *Commitment*

Most officers care deeply about their organization and yearn for the direction and resources to transform the BPD into the most effective law enforcement agency in Maryland.

### **Cultural Obstacles to Change**

#### *Bitterness and cynicism have been widespread*

In many officers' opinions, past police administrations have unknowingly weakened the organization through inattention and indifference to officers' and the City's concerns. Accordingly, officers have felt disrespected by political authorities and the media, and unrecognized by police management for good performance. The perception is that political and public interference has crippled the BPD's ability to execute any clear mission with impact. Officers have felt underresourced and underpaid for the hours they are working.

#### *Distrust has been rampant within the organization.*

60.6% of survey respondents said that distrust among members of the BPD has been a serious problem. Officers who have lacked the clarity of an operational focus for some years now feel vulnerable



to capricious action by authorities inside and outside the department.

*Morale has been low.*

Discouragement and despair have pervaded the organization fed by past leadership styles thought to be unfair and not supportive. Racial divisions have not been discussed openly but have pervaded the department; policies and procedures have been viewed as unfairly administered; performance, as not measured by fair and standardized criteria despite policies enacted with fairness in mind; the promotional system, as unfair and professional. Officers who act according to existing policy have felt they cannot depend on the backing of their superiors. Officer safety, most have thought is not a top concern of management. Rumors and a lack of information have abounded in the absence of clear internal communications. The result has been widespread frustration at all levels of the Department.

## **The Operating Culture**

Just as individuals employ instrumental values (e.g., hard work, thrift, sobriety) to enable them to achieve their terminal values (e.g., wealth, health, long life), organizations behave in similar fashion. The operating culture of an organization is the collection of embraced values, activities, rules, and standards that enable it to achieve its core identity, as upheld consciously or unconsciously by a majority of its members. The core identity of an organization expresses the ultimate value or goal it is trying to achieve.

For example, an electronics company with a long-term industry-leading reputation recognizes that its competitive advantage results from both the cutting-edge nature of its technology and the quality of its product manufacturing. Its *operating culture* therefore, includes pride, commitment, and relentless attention to detail. Its *core identity or culture* is one of innovation and benchmark quality.

***Long removed from its once proud reputation and achievements, the BPD now has an operating culture whose instrumental values are individual survival, group loyalty, frustration and resentment as needs and expectations have gone unmet. Vengeance has appeared to many as the determinant in making personnel decisions.***

### **The Current Condition**

*Inattentive leadership in the past has been blamed for a breakdown in discipline, the absence of accountability, and rampant factionalism. Operational dysfunction has also been fueled by distrust and anger at historical racial inequities, actual or perceived, in the treatment of officers.*

Many BPD officers say that discipline has eroded and with it, accountability.

Current operational dysfunction is attributed by almost every officer to an arbitrary leadership style of past administrations going back, according to some officers, for more than a decade. Leadership, officers say, has been characterized by misguided visions of how to police in Baltimore, unpredictability, racial tension and outright unfairness. As a result, there is widespread sentiment, expressed in interviews and focus groups,

80% of officers surveyed said that discipline is not fair and uniform.

that discipline has eroded and with it, accountability. Despite efforts at standardization of disciplinary actions, some officers think that such actions are selective and not uniform in application. Nearly all survey respondents, 80.2%, said that discipline is not fair and uniform.

Distrust is rampant within the organization. 61.6% of survey respondents said that distrust among members of the BPD is a serious problem.

Factions divide the BPD. Distrust is rampant.

Factionalism is widespread. The now-defunct rotation policy, implemented with the positive goal of assigning officers to new units they had historically been unable to transfer to, had the unintended consequence of nurturing cliques of officers with close working relationships who sought to get around the policy. Accordingly, cliques with competing interests or positions are often in open contest with one another. Factions divide the Department on a broader level as well. Patrol officers interviewed in focus groups believe that patrol operations do not receive the same level of departmental support as specialized units.

Despite the application of the disciplinary matrix for punitive actions, the perceived inability of the department to apply the matrix uniformly to disciplinary practices has fostered allegiances between certain officers and supervisors. As such, some officers are reluctant to work with certain other officers and supervisors or in certain other units because of their uncertainty as to what actions will result in disciplinary proceedings.

Racial tensions and division have not been addressed openly but pervade the BPD.

Racial tensions, which had been historically neglected until recently, have served to further divide officers and contribute to departmental dysfunction. 41.0% of black officers responding to the survey live in the City of Baltimore compared to only 13.6% of white officer respondents. This has led to divergent opinions between the two groups: 41.9% of black officers compared to only 10.1% of white officers responding to the survey believe that officers who do not live in the City of Baltimore do not fully understand neighborhood concerns. Similarly, 52.8% of black officers believe that because there is no residency requirement, many BPD officers do not know the community in which they serve, compared to only 12.6% of whites.

White officers responding to the survey do not share this concern believing that they are more responsive to racial concerns of Baltimore citizens than they are given credit for. 81.5% of white officers compared to 44.5% of black officers believe that members of the BPD are better at relating to people of different races than is true of the general public.

Black officers are more likely to feel that they are not treated equally within the BPD than are white officers.

In addition to different perceptions about the public, black officers believe that they are not treated equally within the Department as whites: only 22.5% of black officer survey respondents believe that all BPD officers regardless of race can expect fair treatment by their supervisors, compared to 59.6% of white officers. This tension has affected the Department operationally: only 40.6% of black officers responding to the survey find it useful to discuss problems with their supervisors, as compared to 53.8% of white officers. In addition, 49.2% of black officers believe that civilians are often stopped by

police because of their race, gender and age, not because of reasonable suspicion or probable cause, as compared to 14.2% of white officers. However, 76.0% of all officers (with no significant difference between black officer and white officer opinions) state that they are not urged to stop and frisk people with no reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

*Supervisory authority has been abdicated and discretion eliminated in response to a history of delegating responsibilities to new and multiple units and multiple levels of supervision. The result has been a breakdown in the chain of command.*

This historical practice of creating new units with limited functions but sharing similar responsibilities with other units has not facilitated a Department-wide focus. Rather, unit commanders have found themselves in conflict with one another, prompting turf battles and fostering attitudes of self-protection.

Supervisors feel that most of their decision making authority has been removed.

Supervisory responsibilities continue to be avoided, in many instances undermining the chain of command. Several supervisors stated that, in most instances, their decision making authority has been removed; others were not confident of support from their superiors for the authoritative decisions that they made. A majority of survey respondents, 71.2%, said that they do not believe that officers in the right will be backed by the Department's higher-ranking officers.

There is a sense that the Department lacks effective supervision. 72.6% of survey respondents agreed that supervisors spend more time doing office work or answering phone calls than supervising.

Furthermore, there is some divisiveness between officers and supervisors: 54.2% of respondents said that supervisors are concerned more about getting credit for themselves than with getting the job done.

Sergeants counter that they are handicapped in exercising their supervisory responsibilities by the lack of clarity on procedures and the lack of discretion and uniformity in disciplinary actions. A number of Sergeants in interviews and focus groups stated that discipline throughout the Districts is not uniform, and the severity of the punishment via application of the matrix is determined by the faction to which the officer belongs. Some sergeants and officers believe that some supervisors look at the matrix first to determine what they believe to be appropriate discipline and then either downgrade or inflate the severity of the inappropriate conduct. Other sergeants believe that the application of the matrix has eliminated their discretion in determining punishment. A majority of officers, 82.1% of survey respondents believe that supervisors should have the discretion on discipline restored to them.

Only 23% of black officers believe they can expect fair treatment from supervisors, compared to 60% of white officers.

Survey respondents were divided on the effectiveness of supervision when it does occur. Only 45.8% said they could expect fair treatment from their supervisors, and 64.1% stated that supervisors are concerned more with being obeyed than with being understood. Further racial divisions within the Department become apparent when these findings are separated by race: only 22.5% of African-American officers believe they can expect fair treatment from their supervisors as compared to 59.6% of whites. 72.2% of African-American officers also agreed that supervisors are concerned

more with being obeyed than understood, as compared to 59.6% of whites.

*The lack of a defined strategy or clear vision for the Department has made officers feel vulnerable to capricious action by authorities inside and outside the Department. Officers are uncertain what is expected of them. Officers routinely feel second-guessed for actions they believed were appropriate. Fear of retribution has led officers to perform at a minimum level and avoid scrutiny at whatever cost to the Department.*

There has been no plan, no pronounced organizational direction for some years now. Although previous Commissioners implemented various policies, the policies were not accompanied by communications that made clear to the rank and file for what they are accountable. Furthermore, policies have also been implemented that have appeared to some officers to be contradictory to what they believe police work to be.

When asked by the survey, officers were of different minds as to what *they think* the overall mission of the BPD to be. Some said the mission was “crime reduction” (27.7%); others, “911 response” (20.5%); or “community service” (17.1%).

Priority department activities should reflect and support the de facto management mission. When officers were asked to rate police activities considered *most important* to BPD management, their responses were revealing of what they view as management priorities.

### Management Priorities, as Viewed by Officers:

1. Making arrests for domestic violence.
2. Responding to 911 calls.
3. Making gun and shooting arrests.
4. Responding to community complaints.
5. Finding and apprehending perpetrators.
6. Arresting drug dealers.
7. Staying out of trouble.

The differences between what officers believe their mission to be and what they are being told to do by management reveals the dysfunctional state in which the BPD has found itself. Accordingly, most officers interviewed were of the perception that different units and personnel play by different rules and that day-to-day operations are not guided by a department-wide directional focus.

Many officers believe that different units play by different rules and are not guided by a department-wide vision.

Both officers and supervisors share the frustration of uncertainty about what the rules are and what is expected of them. The survey findings support this point: 69.1% said department policies and procedures are not clearly written or fairly administered. As a result, officers find themselves less likely to act decisively in situations where they must interpret the rules for themselves. In turn, officers may find their judgment questioned by superiors who must rely on their personal interpretation of events and application of rules. Officers who are determined to act correctly may in fact find themselves subject to harsher discipline than other officers. To protect themselves from potential disciplinary proceedings, officers perform

To avoid unfair discipline, many officers perform only at minimum to avoid calling attention to their actions.



only the minimum of what is expected of them and do only what they are told so as to avoid calling attention to themselves or their actions. The end result is an organization that slowly becomes paralyzed by inactivity and increased frustration.

If the organization is to hold officers strictly accountable for adherence to rules and regulations, greater effort needs to be given to ensuring that rules are known and understood by all officers. Furthermore, officers must be made to feel secure in their actions and their positions such that they are not unduly punished.

*Communications are not consistent within the Department. Authoritative information on procedures, expectations, issues, and developments are sporadic at best. As a result, rumor is rife, speculation abounds, and misinformation is accepted as fact.*

Poor internal communications prevent the BPD from acting effectively as a whole or with external entities.

Poor communications within the BPD have prevented the Department from interacting effectively as a whole or with external entities, according to focus group participants and individuals interviewed.

For many officers, information about Department news, including policies and procedures, comes primarily from unofficial channels. The survey found that almost half – 48.8% – get their information either from peers (29.3%) or from rumors (19.5%).

Operationally, officers say they are handicapped by poor communications among units. In response to a survey question, 81.4% say there is not enough

communication between officers on different shifts or in other assignments/units.

*Performance is not measured by fair and standardized criteria, officers say. Merit is not the most important factor in assignments or promotions. Good performance often goes unrecognized, and rewards are inadequate. There is no concept of a career path.*

75.1% of survey respondents said that the BPD promotional system is not fair and professional. Similarly, 70.7% of officers responding believe that merit is not the most important factor in who gets promoted or receives good assignments.

Inadequate recognition of good performance is a contentious issue among officers.

Inadequate recognition of good performance and inadequate rewards are contentious issues throughout the organization. Performance evaluations, if conducted, are viewed as an ineffective measure of performance and according to some officers interviewed, are meaningless. 57.3% of survey respondents believe the performance evaluations do not accurately reflect police officer duties nor measure officer capabilities.

There were several anecdotal stories told in interviews and focus groups of officers performing meritorious service and receiving no commendation or other recognition of their performance. The feelings expressed by some officers suggest that Department recognition is influenced more by political connections and cronyism rather than by performance – officers who make big arrests on a regular basis receive no recognition while officers who do not make important arrests but “stumble onto a serious crime,” get recognized. Most officers, 84.2% of survey respondents, think the Department does not adequately recognize good performance.

According to some officers, the now-defunct rotation policy helped to create many of these perceptions. Anecdotal stories told in interviews and focus groups told of several unit commanders who, despite the policy, went to lengths to prevent favored officers from being transferred. Other stories similarly revealed that some unit commanders went to greater lengths to prevent officers from being assigned to their units.

There is widespread frustration over what is believed by officers to be the BPD practice of "handpicking" individuals for promotions or special assignments.

Officers also expressed frustration over the practice of what is believed to be the practice of the Department to "handpick" officers for promotion and assignment. Some officers pointed to what they believed to be the practice of filling promotional positions or positions in specialized units according to race or gender. According to the survey, 82.6% of officers responding disagreed with the statement "Neither race, ethnic background nor gender are factors in job assignments, promotions or training opportunities."

Officers were adamant in saying this practice must be stopped, believing that any use quotas should be eliminated – 84.9% of respondents believe that the BPD should not have any quotas by race and 87.8% believe that the BPD should not have any quotas by gender. These beliefs were held by both blacks and whites (78.4% and 95.4% respectively on quotas by race), and by both men and women (89.7% and 75.9% respectively on quotas by gender).

Similarly, other officers expressed that upon seeing the list of officers eligible for promotion, they could guess with great certainty those who would be

promoted. Other officers believed that even if they were eligible for promotion, certain command staff would not promote them out of spite. Still other officers expressed no desire to get promoted – to them the perceived detriments of supervision (especially the elimination of supervisory discretion) outweighed any benefits of attaining higher positions. For these officers, the chain of command has been undermined in perception if not in fact.

Officers want accurate performance measures and career paths detailed for them.

Officers want accurate performance measures and career paths to be detailed for them. Officers want to know what is expected of them and to be able to determine the best path for career advancement. Nearly two-thirds (61.6%) disagree that the career path in the BPD is easily understood. Officers are dissatisfied with the inconsistencies in the current promotion process. 83.7% of survey respondents believe that police officers should be required to spend at least five years in Patrol before becoming eligible to take the Sergeant's test. Similarly, 84.3% believe that Sergeants should be required to spend at least three years as Sergeants before becoming eligible to take the Lieutenant's test. For these officers, standardizing the promotional process would eliminate the perceptions of favoritism and bias plaguing the current system.

*Fear of being the subject of media and public scrutiny has driven many otherwise highly dedicated officers to avoid proactive policing.*

Most officers, 78.6% of those surveyed believe that the relationship between the BPD and the people of Baltimore is not very good. Among survey respondents, 92.1% said that the media coverage of

the BPD does not help BPD officers do their job. Many officers interviewed individually or in focus groups believe that the BPD is slow to respond or does not respond at all to media claims of police ineffectiveness, or officer malfeasance. In many instances, officers believe, the Department is quick to “hang officers out to dry” for conduct the officer believed to be appropriate at that time. This sarcastic view is widely held among officers today: 85.5% of survey respondents believe that in the eyes of the command staff, police officers are guilty until proven innocent.

Because of media and public criticism of the BPD, many officers keep a low profile to stay out of trouble.

Successive negative stories implying BPD ineffectiveness, especially the constant reporting of the yearly murder totals, further exacerbates the feeling of officers that management is more concerned with officers keeping a low profile and staying out of trouble. This feeling has led some officers to perform only at a minimum level, i.e. responding to calls for service but otherwise “not look for trouble.” This perception seems to be confirmed by recent arrest data as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this Plan. Although total arrests have increased over the last few years, index arrests have decreased.

Given the number of complaints against the BPD and its officers in the last five years of officer misuse of force and the number of negative stories in the press about police misuse of force, BPD officers appear *less likely* to act proactively, or in some instances act at all. Some officers interviewed stated that they personally had driven past incidents such as fights normally requiring police intervention because the incident would have required officers to use

some force to subdue a suspect. 85.5% of survey respondents agreed that concerns with civil liability prevent BPD officers from using reasonable and necessary force.

According to the survey, 82.3% of officers responding said that the public generally believes officers use more force than necessary in dealing with suspects. But almost all officers, 93.9%, disagree that this true. As expressed by 92.2% of respondents, they feel that citizens do not understand the problems of the police in enforcing law and order.

*Although the behavior of officers is sometimes motivated by concerns of survival in what has been until recently a dysfunctional organization, professionalism and integrity remain hallmarks of the core culture of the Baltimore Police Department.*

Based on extensive interviews with officers representing almost ten percent of the force, there is no question that the BPD, for the most part, is a corps of dedicated professionals yearning for the opportunity to function as effective law-enforcement officers. They desire the recognition, respect, and support due to men and women who daily put their lives on the line to combat crime and disorder in the City of Baltimore.

BPD officers want to fight crime, and do it professionally and with high integrity.

When asked what they think the mission and critical activities of the BPD should be, the survey found that 34.7% of officers said “crime reduction.” The survey also found that what officers expect of themselves is different from what they perceive the Department to require of them – and the difference

is most encouraging for the crime-fighting effort about to begin:

Officers' Priorities:

1. Finding and apprehending perpetrators.
2. Making gun and shooting arrests
3. Reducing crime, disorder and fear across the City of Baltimore.
4. Protecting and serving the people of Baltimore.
5. Arresting drug dealers.
6. Making arrests for domestic violence.
7. Making timely and complete crime reports.

Management Priorities, as Viewed by Officers:

1. Making arrests for domestic violence.
2. Responding to 911 calls.
3. Making gun and shooting arrests.
4. Responding to community complaints.
5. Finding and apprehending perpetrators.
6. Arresting drug dealers.
7. Staying out of trouble.

*Cynical and discouraged as most officers appear to be, they have not compromised their high standards of personal integrity.*

Almost all officers responding to the survey, 94.5%, would like to see the BPD become the leading model of integrity for all other law enforcement agencies in the state. Of particular note, officers ranked "Integrity (ethical behavior)" as one of their

top two personal values in response to the Department-wide survey.

And officers are willing to act on this desire. 85.2% of officers who responded to the survey said that officers *should* report on one another for serious violations of departmental policy or law. But 66.6% of officers responding feel that they *cannot* make anonymous complaints to IID and feel confident that they will say that way.

BPD officers surveyed recognize different forms of corruption and acknowledge that it can affect the manner in which the BPD functions:

- 96.1% of those officers agree that an example of police corruption is when an officer takes money or drugs from a drug dealer or other criminal.
- 86.4% replied that it is not acceptable for police officers to accept monetary rewards from citizens for good police work.
- 87.4% agreed that the use of drugs off-duty is an example of corruption.

However, one finding of the survey is alarming: 87.5% of respondents believe that some officers are currently taking drugs and/or money from drug dealers. And 23.2% of survey respondents believe that more than a quarter of BPD officers are engaged in this kind of criminal behavior. This finding indicates a serious problem that needs immediate confirmation and redress with tactics discussed in the following chapter. Corrupt behavior, at least by a few officers, likely exists



unknown to police management and supervisory personnel.

*The values most officers in BPD hold reflect a strong self-image that will motive them under effective leadership to become outstanding public servants.*

Choosing from a list of 16 values, the 2,447 respondents to the Department survey were asked to rank at least seven values that are “most important to them.” The following lists the top seven values reflecting the cumulative rank of each value.

#### VALUE RANKING

1. Family Security  
(taking care of loved ones)
2. Integrity  
(ethical behavior)
3. Self Respect  
(self esteem)
4. Happiness  
(being content)
5. A Comfortable Life  
(prosperity)
6. Professionalism  
(high competence at the job)
7. Equality  
(fairness, equal opportunity for all)

Professionalism and integrity are among the top values held by BPD officers.

It is not surprising that the top value, and four of the top seven, are focused on the well-being of one's own family and self. What is encouraging are the high rankings of Integrity and Professionalism, given the new era of accountability about to begin.

8. Community Security  
(freedom from crime, drugs)
9. A Sense of Accomplishment  
(lasting contribution)
10. Freedom  
(independence, free choice)
11. Leisure  
(an enjoyable life away from work)
12. Physical Courage  
(standing up to threats to oneself or others)
13. Upward Mobility  
(promotion, personal progress)
14. Excitement  
(a challenging, active life)
15. Peer Acceptance  
(respect of coworkers)
16. Social Recognition  
(respect, admiration from others)

## **THE PLAN TO DRAMATICALLY REDUCE CRIME IN THE CITY OF BALTIMORE**

Starting immediately, the Baltimore Police Department is being restructured, refocused, and reengineered to attack the problem of violent crime in Baltimore. The changes to the organizational structure and operational focus currently underway and those set forth here in this Plan will restore the confidence of the people of Baltimore in their Police. These actions are within the power of the Police Commissioner, and are being taken at his direction. The Baltimore Police Department will once again exemplify the high values of professionalism and fairness as hallmarks of its identity. Starting today, a reputation for excellence will prevail.

Beyond the Police Commissioner's power, however, is the appropriate rewarding of his officers. These critical needs will be discussed in this same chapter.

**Effective today, the implementation of the COMSTAT Accountability Process will focus all Department units and personnel on the mandate and practice of crime reduction in the unique environment of Baltimore.**

From this day forward, the Baltimore Police Department will be held accountable for crime in Baltimore. This accountability process will shift the focus from reactive radio response to proactive crime solving and crime prevention.

## Restructuring the BPD

Several Criminal Investigation units are being decentralized to District Commands.

All enforcement and external investigative functions of the Baltimore Police Department, exclusive of IAD, are being centralized under the command of the Deputy Commissioner for Operations. The Criminal Investigation Division has been redesigned, with several units having been decentralized to District Commands to report to an Area Detective Squad Commander appointed by and answerable to the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division.

Remaining centralized in the Criminal Investigation Division at Headquarters are the following units: Homicide (to include Cold Cases, Kidnapping, Extortion), Child Abuse, Missing Persons, Sex Offenses, Auto Theft, Pawn Shop, Arson, Check and Fraud, and the Major Case Narcotics Section (to include the Asset Forfeiture and Vice Units). The Warrant Apprehension Task Force, discussed in detail below, will also be centralized within the Criminal Investigation Division.

Investigators decentralized to District Commands will be charged with investigating robberies, burglaries, aggravated assaults, shootings, and drug crimes.

A Warrant Apprehension Task Force is being formed to hunt down Baltimore's violent criminals.

- A Warrant Apprehension Task Force consisting of 30 BPD officers will be formed to apprehend Baltimore's violent criminals; cooperation with the Maryland Division of Corrections, Department of Parole and Probation, and Department of Juvenile Justice will be sought to improve access to all relevant data on those under court-ordered supervision.

- District Detectives will also be responsible for serving warrants and tracking down wanted persons in their geographical areas;
- The BPD will continue to coordinate with the Baltimore County Police Department and all other jurisdictions in the City (Federal, State, and Local) to make certain that the over 54,000 outstanding warrants are systematically and quickly cleared by arrest and incarceration;
- The task force currently formed to transfer control of the Police Athletic League Centers to private organizations will continue to meet to find alternative means of maintaining the after-school and recreational programs; officers formerly assigned to closed PAL centers will be reassigned to District Commands throughout Baltimore.

### **Resourcing the BPD**

The BPD's enforcement strength has been decimated by attrition, officers on medical leave and restricted duty assignments, and by an operational focus that has assigned officers to specific, non-enforcement duties. Currently, only 74% of the 3,274 funded officer positions are available for enforcement duty on the streets of Baltimore.

Sworn officers in the Administrative Bureau whose functions can be handled by civilian staff will be transferred to enforcement duty.

- By April 30, 2000, the Deputy Commissioner for Administration will begin to examine the duties of each position in the Administration Bureau to determine whether positions need to be filled by sworn officers or civilian employees. Wherever possible, able-bodied personnel will be returned to enforcement duty in the Operations Bureau.

- Overtime will be deployed strategically to fill 911 response units until budgeted strength is fully achieved.
- By May 15, 2000, the Deputy Commissioner for Administration will design and implement a program for aggressively monitoring the use of medical leave or restricted duty, to return capable officers to duty and eliminating the positions of those who are permanently unable to return.

At the same time, the rapidly depleting ranks of the BPD must be filled with new, highly qualified, dedicated crime-fighters.

Authorized force strength will be achieved through accelerated recruiting and testing.

#### *Recruitment*

The BPD will be brought to authorized strength as quickly as possible through drastically accelerated recruiting and training.

- By April 30, 2000, the application process for becoming a BPD officer will be reengineered by the Deputy Commissioner for Administration with the goal of expediting the time between testing and hiring.
- The Police Commissioner is reviewing recruitment screening criteria to ensure that standards are appropriate.
- An expanded recruitment advertising and promotion campaign will be launched during Summer 2000, with the goal of attracting highly qualified, diverse candidates.

- The Police Cadet program will be restarted, pending budgetary concerns, to attract qualified candidates between the ages of 18-21 who want to become BPD officers.

## **Refocusing the BPD**

The BPD's patrol deployment has been geared primarily to responding to calls for service. With this current focus, other critical crime fighting activities have been neglected. Only cursory efforts have been given to intelligence gathering through interviewing complainants and debriefing prisoners. Although rudimentary efforts in the old CrimeStac process have been made at compiling statistics from arrests, field investigation reports, etc., the purpose of collecting this data was used to measure police activity, to ensure that officers were "policing" at some acceptable, yet never fully defined level.

COMSTAT moves beyond simple measures of police activity by using all police activity, crime occurrence data, etc., to effectively guide enforcement strategies and tactics, and to synchronize patrol, investigations, and narcotics activities. Information gathered on all crime from each District is shared with the other Districts and as a result, all personnel are held accountable for measurable crime reduction, initially in their patrol Districts, and ultimately throughout the City of Baltimore. More importantly, COMSTAT mandates relentless follow-up and assessment of information, strategies, and their effectiveness.

## COMSTAT

COMSTAT will focus all operational units and personnel on the mandate and practice of crime reduction.

Effective today, the implementation of the COMSTAT Accountability Process, replacing CrimeStac, will focus all operational Department units and personnel on the mandate and practice of crime reduction in the unique environment of Baltimore and hold each responsible for measurable crime reduction. An Administrative COMSTAT will refocus the Department's non-enforcement units to support the crime fighting mission by making certain that all key organizational systems deliver efficiently run, fairly administered, professional services to the Department.

COMSTAT is based on four fundamental principles:

- *Accurate, timely intelligence communicated to all.*  
If the police are to respond effectively to crime, officers at all levels of the organization must have accurate knowledge of where particular types of crimes are occurring, when and how the crimes are being committed, and who the criminals are. The likelihood of an effective police response to crime increases proportionally as the accuracy of this criminal intelligence increases.
- *Rapid deployment which is synchronized and focused.*  
Personnel and other necessary resources need to be promptly deployed where crime has occurred. A viable and coordinated response to a crime or quality of life problem usually demands that patrol personnel, investigators, and support personnel bring their expertise and resources to bear in a synchronized effort.



- *Effective tactics.*

Effective tactics based on analysis of accurate and timely crime intelligence need to be prudently designed to bring about crime reduction. In order to avoid simply displacing crime and quality of life offenses, and to bring about change permanently, these tactics must be comprehensive, flexible, and adaptable to shifting crime trends identified and monitored.

- *Relentless follow-up and assessment.*

An on-going process of rigorous follow-up and assessment is absolutely essential to ensure that the desired results are actually being achieved. This evaluation component permits redeployment of resources to meet newly identified challenges once a problem has abated. It also permits assessment of the viability of particular tactics for developing future responses.

District Commanders and Detective Squad Commanders will be held accountable for crime reduction in their Districts.

Since last week, all nine District Commanders and their Detective Squad Commanders have begun weekly meetings with the Police Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner for Operations during which they are questioned on:

- crimes against persons and property in their command areas, especially murders, shootings, narcotics, aggravated assaults, and robberies, and the arrests being made in each crime category;
- their current deployment strategy;
- pending investigations;
- the Detectives' rate of case clearances, especially case cleared by arrest;
- the declination rate for homicide cases by the State Attorney's Office;

- the overtime allotment strategy and its impact on crime.

UCR and arrest data will be gathered daily and mapped at weekly COMSTAT meetings to monitor, track, and respond to crime.

The Deputy Commissioner for Operations has developed a system for daily reporting of district-level UCR and arrest data, which includes month-to-date and year-to-date information with the same periods of the preceding year. This information is mapped and examined at the District and Headquarter levels at COMSTAT meetings. These maps will aid Commanders in developing anti-crime strategies to address crime hot spots. These maps include:

- all major crimes and arrests, mapped according to occurrence during the current week, the previous four weeks, and year-to-date; comparisons are made to the same period of the previous year;
- citywide and by District, year-to-date maps of all homicides, shootings, gun arrests, and stranger rapes;
- all narcotics crime incidents and arrests, for the previous 90 days and for the previous four weeks;
- all open felony warrants by charge.

Other law local , state, and federal law enforcement agencies will be invited to weekly COMSTAT meetings to share critical crime intelligence.

To ensure that accurate and timely intelligence is available to all law enforcement agencies in Baltimore, the BPD has begun inviting to the weekly COMSTAT meetings representatives from the Housing Police, the State's Attorney's Office, the Baltimore School Police Officers, and the Baltimore Sheriff's Department. Similarly, all federal agencies operating in the City of Baltimore – FBI, DEA, ATF, INS, and U.S. Attorney's Office – have been invited weekly to discuss violent crime trends in the City of Baltimore.

Starting this week, the Deputy Commissioner for Administration has begun weekly meetings with all Unit

Commanders in the Administration Bureau to ensure the standardization of the methodology for defining, measuring, and producing all operational data in support of the crime-fighting mission. A formal Administrative COMSTAT, beginning within thirty days and to occur on a biweekly basis, will focus commanders on the day-to-day activities of their units and hold them accountable for ensuring that unit and Department goals are realized. Unit commanders will also identify and quantify on a weekly, monthly, year-to-date basis, their unit's performance activities relevant to the Operations Bureau in its crime reduction efforts.

### *Crime Fighting*

District Commanders are being granted the authority, resources, and accountability to address crime and quality of life issues in the communities they serve.

Patrol and investigative personnel needs will be redefined by District and shift based on crime incidence.

- By July 1, District Commanders will receive decentralized budgets for equipment, supply, and overtime.
- In response to weekly COMSTAT data, patrol and investigative personnel deployment needs will be redefined by District and by shift within each District, based on analyses of violent crime incidents including all shootings, property crimes incidents, narcotics activity, and calls for service in each patrol area of the City, and in consideration of increased force strength at the District level resulting from decentralization of the Department.
- The Deputy Commissioner for Operations will begin the use of 2-officer vehicles in high-crime Districts to

increase officer safety, reduce the need for police backup, and decrease the likelihood of unnecessary police shootings.

- By May 30, the Deputy Commissioner for Operations will examine patrol and supervisory deployment to set appropriate spans of control that minimize the use of Officers-in-Charge and Sergeants-in-Charge.

### *Accountability*

Profile Sheets have been developed for District Commanders and Detective Squad Commanders to track and monitor performance.

District Commander Profile Sheets have been developed which summarize the key indicators for individual performance of District Commanders. These sheets include: time in rank, appointment date, education, previous commands, district demographics, district personnel by assignment and rank, overtime, summons and arrest activity in the command, uniformed personnel vacancy rates, 911 response time, unfounded radio runs, domestic violence calls, and relevant crime data. Where relevant, changes in these categories from the same period of the previous year are included.

Detective Squad Commanders' Profile Sheet have also been developed which summarize: time in rank, appointment date, education, previous commands, date of current assignment, squad personnel, open cases by category, clearance rates for all major crime categories, number of interviews of prisoners, arrests, domestic violence cases, search warrants executed, arrest warrants executed, etc.

These tracking tools will be used by the Police Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner for Operations to track and manage the performance of all crime-fighting

units of the Department. Similar tools will be employed by all major support units whose work is essential to the success of the crime-reduction effort.

### *Strategies*

Crime-fighting strategies tailored to specific crimes and unique crime circumstances of Baltimore will be developed.

New crime-fighting strategies tailored to the unique crime circumstances in Baltimore will be designed to deal with murder, shootings, narcotics trafficking, armed and simple robbery, aggravated assault, domestic violence, burglary, auto theft, and quality of life violations.

- In addition to the Warrant Apprehension Task Force, District Commanders will have responsibility for tracking down and arresting those persons wanted on warrants in their patrol areas.
- The Safe Neighborhood Initiative has been asked to begin to hold monthly anti-crime summits in all troubled neighborhoods, to include the participation of known offenders in these areas.
- The U.S. Attorney has agreed to dramatically increase the number of federal prosecutions for those arrested with illegal weapons and ammunition. Aggressive enforcement of similar programs in other jurisdictions throughout the country has resulted in as high as a 50% reduction in the number of guns on the street.
- A Crime Analysis Unit has been formed to track crime patterns and trends, and chronic crime conditions. This unit will report to the Deputy Commissioner for Administration; each District and the Criminal Investigation Division will also be responsible for crime analysis to ensure a seamless web in tracking crime.

### *Calls for Service*

Police response to 911 calls for non-crime and non-emergency incidents will be reduced.

Calls for service will be evaluated on a weekly basis with the goal of reducing response to non-emergency and non-crime incidents in order to expand resources for fighting crime.

- Mayor O'Malley will propose to the City Council a new ordinance that will impose stiff fines on alarm monitoring companies, not their subscribers, for the innumerable false alarms reported to the BPD.

### **Reengineering the BPD**

Every BPD system and procedure will be reengineered to support the crime-reduction mission.

Not only must day-to-day focus of all personnel and units be retrained on the mission of reducing crime in a collaborative partnership with the community, every system and procedure in the Department must be altered to reflect and support this mission. This must be done to create a new culture of fairness and respect within the BPD regardless of race, ethnicity and gender.

### *Disciplinary System*

The Disciplinary Matrix has been universally denounced within the Department for removing all discretion on charging and penalties, inundating with trivial cases (thereby crippling) the Internal Investigations Division (now renamed the Internal Affairs Division), and reinforcing the sense among officers that it is far safer to take no action on the streets than to practice assertive policing.

The authority for dealing with lower level disciplinary offenses will be returned to the Commands.

By May 30, the following changes will return authority and responsibility to Commands for dealing with lower level offenses and will remove two-thirds of cases going to Internal Affairs from the disciplinary system.

#### Minor Offenses

All minor offenses, classified as A – C according to the Disciplinary Matrix will now be investigated and adjudicated by the violating officer's Command.

- The Legal Affairs Unit will make itself available to provide Unit Commanders with advice concerning charges and specifications and command disciplines.
- The top penalties for Category A – C offenses are being reduced from four days loss of leave or pay to three days to enable the Department, under the requirements of Article 27, §727(d) of the Annotated Code of Maryland (Maryland Criminal Code) to use single-member trial boards for these minor offenses.
- The FOP is being asked in current collective-bargaining discussions to reduce from four to one the number of preemptory rejections of Trial Board judges, or “strikes,” for Category A – C offenses. The FOP is also being asked to reduce the current 45-day review period to 14 days for minor offenses.
- All reports of disciplinary violations, sustained or otherwise, will be referred to Legal Affairs for tracking of officer discipline.
- The Human Resources Division will routinely audit a statistically valid sample of reports adjudicated to ensure that discipline throughout the Department remains fair

and uniform; Unit Commanders will confer with the Legal Affairs Unit, prior to adjudicating a third command discipline for the same officer within a six-month period, to determine if additional charges should be levied.

- The refusal of discipline for minor offenses by officers will result in the convening of a Trial Board within 30 days.
- Specific training in use of discretion and application of discipline will be provided to all Unit Commanders to ensure that disciplinary measures taken are consistent and uniform throughout the Department.

#### Serious Offenses

Category D, E, and F offenses will continue to be investigated by IAD, Traffic, or EEOC as appropriate.

The disciplinary process for serious offenses will be reengineered for simplification.

- A Reengineering Team will be formed this week, consisting of representatives from the FOP, Vanguard Society, Internal Affairs, Legal Affairs, Community Relations Commission, and Human Resources Division, will be formed to review the disciplinary process for serious offenses for further simplification.
- Internal Affairs will continue to investigate all serious category D – F offenses and at the conclusion of their investigation, IA investigators will confer with Legal Affairs about the charges to be filed. This will remove the possibility of officers having charges ultimately sustained against them by IAD without having the charges adjudicated by Legal Affairs.



- Legal Affairs will set a goal for disposing of all cases within 90 days after notification to the officer of the impending charges.
- When circumstances so dictate, Legal Affairs will first offer the minimum charge for all offenses to induce officer acceptance of all discipline to avoid extending the process all the way to a Trial Board.
- The Human Resources Division will review all statements of facts and charges of discipline to ensure that discipline throughout the Department remains fair and uniform.
- All disputes between Human Resources and Legal Affairs concerning charges for category D – F offenses will be referred for resolution to the Deputy Commissioner in which the officer's command is located.

#### Accountability to Police Officers

- Final dispositions of all charges will be given in writing to officers charged.

#### *Internal Affairs Division*

Internal Affairs is being reengineered into a dedicated and proactive operation that will best serve the citizens of Baltimore as a caretaker of high professional conduct and a guardian against police corruption. Corruption, even by one officer, can destroy the public's trust. Of serious concern in this regard is the following finding of the Department survey: while 48.7% of respondents believe that 5% or less of BPD officers are stealing money or drugs

from drug dealers, 23.2% believe that the number is greater than a quarter of the Department.

The citizen complaint intake system will be improved to ensure an accurate record of complaints against officers.

A new commanding officer of IAD is being hired, and:

- By Summer 2000, the citizen complaint intake system will be improved to ensure that all complaints against officers are received as recorded in the words of the complainants.
- By July 1, 2000, a system will be developed whereby citizen complaints against officers will be mapped by District and tour of duty to identify patterns of abuse by officers, as well as to record complaints against officers involved in shootings and claiming assaults.
- By Summer 2000, the Inspections Unit will establish an audit capacity for compliance with policy.
- By May 30, 2000, an Integrity Control Officer at the rank of Lieutenant will be appointed in each District to maintain the integrity of citizen complaints and monitor officer conduct.
- A system will be developed to monitor and, where necessary, discipline and retrain officers with multiple citizen complaints for abuse of force, abuse of authority, abridgement of civil rights, or acts of disrespect.
- IAD investigators will make arrests for narcotics violations and debrief those suspects for knowledge of police complicity.

Officers with multiple citizen complaints will be monitored and, where necessary, disciplined and retrained.

Integrity tests will be fielded routinely to root out corrupt officers.

More importantly, Internal Affairs will undertake a focused and concentrated program to root out police corruption.

- IAD will begin to design and field proactive integrity tests, or stings, on both a random and targeted basis, to identify and remove BPD officers who have violated the public's trust; this will require training by consultants and/or other investigative agencies.
- Integrity tests will also be conducted to detect mishandling of evidence and other property; and other unprofessional conduct.

### *Training*

Accountability can be demanded only if officers are adequately trained to respond to the demands of an assignment.

The BPD training curriculum at all levels will be reengineered for an organization now dedicated to COMSTAT outcome-focused accountability.

- Consultants and/or experienced personnel from other agencies will train District enforcement personnel in the use of the COMSTAT system.
- Consultants and/or experienced personnel from other agencies will conduct Criminal Investigation Courses for all District and centralized detective units. These one-week courses will be conducted for 25 detectives each, and will start in May, 2000.
- Specific training will be provided to all enforcement personnel in the use of deadly force to minimize the number of officer-involved shootings.

Training in the correct standards of reasonable suspicion and probable cause in stop and frisk procedures will also be given all patrol officers.

- Specific training will be provided to all officers on how to target and arrest wanted offenders in such a manner as to minimize violence and threats to public and officer safety.
- Training will also be provided to all patrol officers in stop and frisk procedures including the correct standards of reasonable suspicion and probable cause.
- All street-based tactical training will be conveyed in a manner that teaches officers to incorporate knowledge of diverse cultures in handling high-conflict situations.

The Acting Police Commissioner will appoint a Task Force by April 2000 to reengineer the training curriculum at all levels for an organization now dedicated to the COMSTAT outcome-focused management and accountability process. The goal will be to establish the following for each level of training:

#### Recruit Training

- the schedule and milestones for training each complement of new officers in Department General Orders, on the job activities, and the precepts of community policing;
- the schedule and milestones for a training curriculum which cross-trains recruits in highly effective patrol, investigative, and narcotics activities as assertive efforts are undertaken to meet the BPD's budgeted strength;
- the design of a new integrity curriculum which integrates correct police street tactics with lawful and proper treatment of suspects.

### In-Service Training – Officers

- the schedule and milestones for putting in place a revamped mandatory annual in-service training program, specifically geared to officers below the rank of Sergeant;
- the determination of course subjects specifically critical for success of the crime-fighting mission as well as other subjects this assessment has identified as needed (e.g., stress management, interpersonal communications, officer safety, conflict resolution, and report writing).

### In-Service Training – Supervisors

- the schedule and milestones for putting in place the BPD's first annual cycle of mandatory in-service training specifically geared to Sergeants and Lieutenants which will ensure that all supervisors in the Department receive up-to-date instruction in the ways and means of assuring lawful and respectful police activities in patrol, investigations, and narcotics enforcement.

### Detective Training

- the schedule and milestones for training all detectives in interview and investigation techniques;
- the schedule and milestones for training Internal Affairs detectives in the internal investigation practices and tactics, including use of investigative technology and sting operations, proven most effective in other police departments;
- the schedule and milestones for training Narcotics Major Case Section detectives in the special techniques of investigation and interdiction of major narcotics distribution.

### Executive Training

- the schedule and milestones for putting in place in the BPD's first annual cycle of mandatory in-service training specifically geared to police executives (Commanders and above) which will ensure that all executives in the Department receive up-to-date training in the ways and means of orchestrating dramatic reductions in crime through the use of the COMSTAT process at every command level;
- the schedule and milestones for developing innovative goal-oriented police tactics and coordinating these with other agencies and community entities to reduce violent crime, youth violence, narcotics trafficking, domestic violence and child abuse, auto-related crime, and quality of life violations.

### *Inspections*

Crime reports will be audited routinely for accuracy and integrity.

An Inspections Unit will be formed in May 2000, reporting directly to the Acting Police Commissioner, to ensure among other things, that crime reports are audited routinely for accuracy, thoroughness, and integrity, and matched up with calls for service, and to establish a reliable baseline and verified tracking of crime and law enforcement in Baltimore. Other functions will include but are not limited to: monitoring officer appearance and effectiveness in court, checking phone courtesy of Department members, auditing confidential informant files, and property room process.

- The Inspections Unit will be trained in UCR coding requirements and continuously review criminal incident reports to ensure that the reports accurately measure the extent of crime in the City of Baltimore.

- Reports found to be miscoded will be identified and tracked by officer, shift and District to maintain accountability and identify those officers and reviewers who need retraining.

### *Technology*

A technical response unit will be formed to provide electronic surveillance of criminal activities.

To improve the operating and investigative capabilities of the BPD, a technical response unit is being formed April 2000. This unit will be modeled on cutting-edge response units in other large cities. This unit will provide technical support by creating electronic surveillance capabilities – electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping, etc. – where none now exist in the BPD. The unit will be commanded by one of the nation’s leading experts in this area.

As technology improves and new systems are developed, the BPD will upgrade or purchase new platforms and systems to maintain connectivity vital to effective policing today. Critical to the crime-fighting effort will be the procurement and installation of:

Technological systems will be procured to maintain connectivity vital to effective policing today.

- correct and sufficient computer hardware and software networked among Districts and all units for foreseeable technological uses, including real-time crime reporting and analysis, detective case management, warrants tracking, inventory control, and personnel administration;
- electronic pin-mapping in each District to record and track daily crime incidents, street by street, as an aid to identifying hot spots and developing effective enforcement tactics;
- a police-oriented photo imaging system in all District commands to allow complainants and officers to look

for suspects from the database of those with criminal records, including parolees, by description or MO as well as by name; and to allow complainants to look for police officers suspected of abuse of force or other misconduct;

- laptop computers or MDTs to be installed in marked police cruisers; this will enable Patrol Officers to check on wanted vehicles and persons almost immediately, and to generate on-line criminal incident reports;
- video camcorders for selected marked police cruisers to monitor and record officer conduct in engagements with suspects; and
- an Automatic Vehicle Locator (AVL) system to enable Patrol Supervisors to track the exact locations of all officers in the field.

The Deputy Commissioner for Administration will conduct an assessment of the basic data processing systems of the Department by Summer 2000 to determine the causes and remedies for the inability of the agency to provide reliable and consistent reports on staffing, assignments, crime, calls for service, etc.

### *Performance Appraisals*

Performance evaluations will be modified to better evaluate officer accountability for crime reduction.

To deal with the finding that 57.3% of officers responding to the survey believe the current performance evaluations to be an inaccurate measure of police officer duties and capabilities, the Acting Police Commissioner will appoint a Task Force by Summer 2000 to modify the current semi-annual Performance Evaluation Report. The new Performance Appraisal will be written for each rank of the



agency to better evaluate officer accountability for measurable crime reduction and in the administrative units, for results-focused support efforts. All supervisors will be trained to evaluate performance using standardized and objective revised criteria. This will be accomplished by consultants working with internal personnel in 2001.

### *Promotional System*

To foster professionalism, bolster morale, and not least, hone the crime-fighting edge of the BPD, it is imperative that officer talent and dedication are recognized through the promotional system. Officers must have a clear understanding that career opportunity is predicated on performance; they must have a clear sense of career path. To that end, consultants will work with internal personnel to redesign the criteria for promotion that will include use of the new performance appraisal instruments, fitness standards, commendations, etc. The Acting Police Commissioner will appoint a Task Force in April 2000 to develop a written career path grid for use throughout the agency.

A career path grid will be developed.

### *Cultural Change Communications*

Conscious, orchestrated effort must be undertaken to uproot the culture of vengeance and distrust, resolve racial divisions within the Department, and gain full-hearted commitment to the crime-fighting mission.

Internal communications will be used to transform the culture of the BPD.

- The Acting Police Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner for Operations, and other members of the command staff will issue oral, written, and where necessary videotape communications to internal police

and civilian personnel to convey the facts of their assessments and the actions they are taking based on these assessments. These communications will be made to gain commitment to the Department's new mission of crime fighting effectively accomplished with respect for all citizens. These communications will also help construct a culture that instills fairness and respect, and inspires a restored sense of pride and professionalism.

### *Public Accountability*

The BPD will become transparent to the public so the public it serves can monitor and assess progress in reducing crime.

Crime reduction in Baltimore can only be achieved by a police department respectful of the citizens it serves. Inherent in this police/community partnership is openness on law enforcement activities. The Baltimore Police Department will become transparent to the public so that the public it serves will be able to monitor and assess the BPD's progress in dramatically reducing crime in the City of Baltimore. The BPD cannot and will not operate in a shroud of secrecy.

- A program will be developed to disseminate to the public monthly and year-to-date statistics and other pertinent information on crime incidents and arrests in each District. Eventually this information will be placed on a web site so citizens have access to the crime maps being used by the Department.

## **Rewarding the BPD**

Ways will be sought to bring BPD officer pay in line with neighboring jurisdictions.

Out of a critical concern for the BPD's ability to recruit and retain high-quality police officers, the Mayor, faced with serious budget deficits, is nevertheless seeking a way for the City Council to approve police pay increases that will bring compensation into a competitive relationship with the Baltimore County Police Department.

Substantial salary increases are recommended for ranks Patrol Officer through Colonel:

- to provide greater incentives to advance through the ranks;
- so that officers are not forced to work secondary employment to make a living; and
- to compete more successfully with recruitment efforts of other departments.

## **RESTORING POLICE-COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY**

The decentralization of the BPD will empower police officers to identify neighborhood problems and act in partnerships with residents to solve them.

The decentralization of the BPD, placing most enforcement and investigative functions under District Commands, is critical to concentrating accountability at the level where service is delivered. This empowers police officers to identify neighborhood problems and act in partnerships with neighborhood residents to solve them. The present command-and-control management style of the BPD cannot by its nature easily give birth to the style of policing that stresses initiative over obedience, promotes intimacy rather than detachment, and measures overall improvement in quality of impact.

The fundamental role of Baltimore's police officers is to identify, reduce, and remove the conditions that foster fear across all neighborhoods.

Decentralization of the BPD will place the police officer at the front rank of the organization, not the lowest rank, at the delivery point of service and problem solving in the community. By virtue of their training, equipment, and desire to be of service, Baltimore's police officers are the City's best hope for leading and catalyzing change that will safeguard the economic and social strength of the neighborhoods.

## ENDNOTES

1. *Crime in the United States, 1998*, FBI.
2. UCRs, or Index Crimes, include murder and non-negligent homicide, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny theft, and auto theft.
3. Rates for Baltimore were calculated using the 1990 U.S. Census population breakdown by race, by sex, by age.
4. Dispatched calls for service are those 911 calls that result in a police officer responding to the location given in the call. Since every 911 call does not result in an officer responding, the yearly total is less than the total number of 911 calls received. Also excluded here are administrative calls where an officer is taken out of service.
5. All focus groups were conducted prior to Mayor O'Malley's appointment of a BPD Police Commissioner.
6. *Baltimore Sun*, February 15, 2000, via Internet.
7. *1998 Police Wage and Benefits Survey*, Labor Relations Information System, Portland, OR. The other city utilizing a 6/2 shift schedule is Allentown, PA; 1998 population: 106,000; 1998 murder rate: 14.3.
8. UCR Part II index offenses are those less serious crimes than Part I as detailed in Chapter 2 of this Plan. Crimes such as Malicious Destruction of Property, Common Assault, Lost Property, Vandalism, etc. account for Part II offenses.
9. The jurisdictions participating in this survey were, in alphabetical order: Anne Arundel County Police Department, Arlington County PD, Baltimore County PD, BPD, Charles County Sheriff's Office, Delaware State Police, Fairfax County PD, Howard County PD, Mass Transit Administration Police, Metropolitan Police Department, Montgomery County PD, New Jersey State Police, New York State Police, Pennsylvania State Police, Prince George's County PD, Virginia State Police, and West Virginia State Police.
10. *1998 Police Wage and Benefit Survey*.

## **APPENDIX**

### Appendix A – Crime Report Audit Process Overview

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<sup>1</sup> *Crime in the United States, 1998*, FBI

<sup>2</sup> UCR Crime

<sup>3</sup> Rates for Baltimore calculated using the 1990 U.S. Census population breakdown by race, by sex, by age.

<sup>4</sup> Dispatched calls for service are those 911 calls that result in the sending of a police officer to the location given in the call. Since not all 911 calls result in the sending of an officer, using the total calls to 911 would be an overestimate of the demand for police service.

<sup>5</sup> These focus groups of Baltimore citizens were conducted prior to Mayor O'Malley's appointment of Colonel Ronald Daniel to Police Commissioner.

<sup>6</sup> Baltimore Sun, February 15, 2000, via Internet.

<sup>7</sup> *1998 Wage and Benefits Survey*, Labor Relations Information System, Portland, OR; July 1998. The other city is Allentown, PA; 1998 population: 106,000, 1998 murder rate: 14.3.

<sup>8</sup> UCR Part II index offenses are those less serious crimes than Part I as detailed in Chapter 2 of this Plan. Crimes such as Malicious Destruction of Property, Common Assault, Lost Property, Vandalism, etc. account for Part II offenses.

<sup>9</sup> The jurisdictions participating in the survey were, in alphabetical order: Anne Arundel County Police Department, Arlington County PD, Baltimore County PD, BPD, Charles County Sheriff's Office, Delaware State Police, Fairfax County PD, Howard County PD, Mass Transit Administration Police, Metropolitan Police Department, Montgomery County PD, New Jersey State Police, New York State Police, Pennsylvania State Police, Prince George's County PD, Virginia State Police, and West Virginia State Police.

<sup>10</sup> *1998 Police Wage and Benefit Survey*, Labor Relations Information System, Portland, OR.